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INTRODUCTION
1.  Mortgage distress is affecting a growing number of 
Australian households. Distress ranges from arrears 
in mortgage payments to defaults, foreclosures and 
repossessions. The impacts of mortgage distress are 
complex and include issues relating to the ongoing 
financial viability of the affected households, wider 
neighbourhood effects, and a range of psychological 
and social impacts. In recent years, mortgage stress has 
had a consistently higher prevalence in certain parts of 
Western Sydney than in any other region across Australia.
2.  This study is an attempt to uncover the experiences of 
mortgage distress in Western Sydney and of mortgage 
holders’ coping strategies. While not claiming to be a 
representative sample of mortgagors in distress, the 
report reveals much about the circumstances contributing 
to mortgage distress and its considerable impacts on the 
lives of those affected.
CHAPTER 2
3.  A rise in the incidence of mortgage distress in Sydney 
can be sourced to the easy access to mortgage finance 
for once excluded households from the mid to the late 
1990s. Not surprisingly, mortgage distress has higher 
incidence in those suburbs where there are higher 
concentrations of both lower socio-economic and recent 
migrant communities.
4.  Experience of housing market collapse in US 
neighbourhoods alerts us to the potentially severe effects 
of mortgage defaulting on affected households and 
neighbourhoods as well as on the stability of a nation’s 
financial system.
  Unlike in the USA, large scale mortgage defaulting in 
particular neighbourhoods has been avoided in Australia. 
Household debt levels among lower income households 
have been contained; predatory lending practices are 
uncommon; housing price falls have been modest and 
sub-regional; and the nation’s labour market downturn 
has not been severe. A US-style snowballing of mortgage 
defaulting and walkaways has thus been avoided in 
Australia.
5.  Yet ratings agency data reveal higher than average 
incidence of mortgages arrears in Western Sydney in 
recent years. Six of Australia’s poorest performing regions 
in terms of mortgage delinquency were located in Western 
Sydney in September 2009. There is a high correlation 
between mortgage arrears in these districts and their 
worse-than-average labour market conditions.
  Importantly, as noted, the co-incidence of mortgage arrears 
and poor labour market conditions has not resulted in 
mortgage defaulting of any significance. Our study found 
strong evidence, though, that the absence of significant 
defaulting is explainable by the extraordinary level of 
commitment maintained by households to servicing their 
dream of homeownership.
CHAPTER 3
6.  An important context for understanding the issue of 
mortgage distress is the trend towards the assignment of 
risk to the level of the household. Whereas governments 
and a range of societal institutions like religious 
organisations and mutual societies once insured households 
against economic and financial risk, especially in relation to 
income protection, households are increasingly responsible 
both for managing their income profiles in their working and 
retirement years and for maintaining spending on physical, 
human and social capital items such as health, education 
and housing.
7.  The shift of risk to households coincides with easier 
access to debt finance especially via the liberalising of the 
criteria for household access to debt. As leverage ratios 
rise however, households become increasingly vulnerable 
to events that disrupt household income. Typically these 
disruptions come from ill health, unemployment, relationship 
breakdowns and child birth. Thus mortgage distress is 
closely related to these events.
CHAPTER 4
8.  There is a range of indicators that show mortgage stress is 
a growing problem. These indicators identify the range of 
stress being experienced, many of the attributes associated 
with stress, and its spatial and demographic distribution. 
  In addition, the terrains of the economy and the financial 
market in Australia have been altered in ways that suggest 
the preconditions for mortgage stress are always present, 
but their incidence varies among households over time. 
EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Many data collection exercises are designed to monitor 
the effect of mortgage stress on the performance of 
financial products (e.g. a mortgage-backed security) 
or on the financial stability of lenders, rather than the 
viability or experiences of borrowers. Rarely do data sets 
capture households that regularly meet their mortgage 
commitments, yet find it more and more difficult to do 
so. Such people may not directly affect banks through 
arrears or defaulting, but they do suffer significantly from 
the pressures of financial stress. This unrevealed stress is 
vastly under explored.
CHAPTER 5
9.  The pursuit of homeownership in Australia has powerful 
social and cultural origins. Historically, homeownership 
is given financial, including taxation, preference by 
governments over other forms of housing tenure. In a 
context of house-price inflation, homeownership has 
become an important vehicle for wealth creation.
10.  The process of securing a home loan seems not to be a 
well-informed one for households most at risk of mortgage 
distress. Our study finds considerable information deficit 
at the time of mortgage search and procurement for those 
households who later experience mortgage distress. 
As well, there appears to be a veil over householders’ 
objective judgement of an appropriate mortgage product, 
perhaps produced by rising aspirationalism across a range 
of socio-economic and cultural groups.
CHAPTER 6
11.  Our study encountered major and unusual difficulties 
in recruiting participants. Our interpretation of an 
unwillingness to participate is that Australians are 
extremely wary of affirming any implication of failure in the 
homeownership task. Nevertheless, our study presents rich 
findings from 33 comprehensive survey responses and 16 
detailed face-to-face interviews.
CHAPTER 7
12.  Our survey recruitment process reveals much about the 
nature of mortgage distress in Australia. One insight is that 
indices of mortgage stress and distress – such as those 
produced in academic studies and ratings surveys – fail 
to reveal the complex and disturbing levels of difficulty 
encountered by households struggling to maintain 
mortgage repayments, even though these households 
might not actually be in mortgage arrears.
CHAPTER 8
13.  The report captures the intensity of borrowers’ experience 
of mortgage distress through the presentation of extracts 
and summaries of their stories. The vignettes demonstrate 
the vulnerability of low income earners to mortgage 
distress, the crucial impact of income loss, and the 
complex relationship between a commitment to mortgage 
repayments and quality of life.
CHAPTER 9
14.  These issues are explored systematically in chapter 9, which 
traces the steps of seeking and securing a mortgage and 
then of coping with mortgage distress. 
15.  The analysis confirms that the decision to borrow in order 
to purchase, rather than rent, is driven by an interplay of 
economic and cultural reasons.
16.  Respondents acknowledged that in securing a mortgage 
they gave insufficient attention to understanding the 
mortgage contract and assessing their capacity to pay. 
Importantly, while our respondents were reluctant to 
accuse lenders and brokers of deceptive or unscrupulous 
behaviour, there was a common view that an institutional 
approval of a loan application constituted a judgement by 
the institution that the household was capable of meeting its 
mortgage repayment obligations.
17.  Our findings confirmed the literature on the reasons for 
mortgage distress: that its incidence correlates highly with 
changes in household income, changes in personal or family 
circumstances and illness. The effects of these changes, 
not surprisingly, were compounded by pre-existing levels of 
over-commitment of income to servicing a mortgage. 
18.  Respondents revealed a complex and desperate range of 
strategies to confront rising levels of mortgage distress. 
These included debilitating efforts to minimise essential 
household expenditure, irrational use of credit cards, a 
range of fairly inadequate lender interventions, accessing 
superannuation savings, taking on supplementary 
casual work, and resort to independent advice and other 
assistance especially from non-government, community 
sector support agencies.
19.  Individuals confronting mortgage distress revealed intense 
and ongoing negative impacts on their and their families’ 
lives. The feeling of shame and failure pervades, as do 
loneliness and sadness to the point of depression. Driving 
these emotions is the perception that borrowers’ lives have 
become entrapped by their debt.
20.  Reflecting the strength of their commitment to 
homeownership, however, our respondents claimed a 
remarkable optimism about their capacity to resolve their 
current difficulties, should they still be in possession of a 
mortgage, or to resume a successful life where the dream of 
homeownership has ended.
21.  The most common regret among distressed borrowers 
was their failure to gather adequate information to 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
make informed decisions about their capacity to meet 
contracted repayments.
CHAPTER 10
22.  Our prime conclusion is that the vulnerability of 
households to financial and especially mortgage distress 
needs to become a central issue in the way we conceive 
of financial stability. The concept of financial stability must 
apply not only to financial institutions but to households 
as well. Such recognition requires that the process of 
financial regulation serves wider social needs than has 
hitherto been interpreted.
CHAPTER 11 (POLICY)
The report recommends the following:
1.  There be more extensive research on household 
experiences of financial stress and mortgage distress, to 
discern further their patterns and causes. Currently, this 
research is being conducted on the one hand by housing 
researchers with no direct links to issues of financial 
regulation, and on the other hand by ratings agencies and 
financial institutions whose focus is on risk management, 
but without an understanding or agenda for addressing the 
social problems of financial stress and mortgage distress. 
The social problems of household financial stress and 
mortgage distress need to be seen as integral to financial 
regulation.
2.  Monitoring of the causes, evidence and consequences of 
mortgage distress (and financial stress in general) need to 
be distinctive and discrete tasks within financial regulation. 
These are not matters that can adequately be covered 
under the responsibilities for the prudential supervision 
of financial institutions (APRA), or for financial literacy 
concerns (ASIC).
3.  The community services, government and non-
government organisations which deal with people in 
financial stress and mortgage distress possess enormous 
knowledge of householder experiences of mortgage 
distress and under-recognised source of generous 
and capable assistance. Together these assistance 
organisations should be regarded as more than the 
providers of assistance to those who have failed to leap 
the home ownership hurdle. These organisations are an 
important resource which needs to be brought inside 
mainstream management of financial stability.
4.  The regulation of mortgage products needs to 
acknowledge the vulnerability of many borrowers:
   a. More and better information resources need to be 
created in order to help people make better decisions 
about their mortgages. The value of this information is 
diminished, however, if exaggerated and uncontested 
claims about mortgage products are disseminated 
via the advertising campaigns of mortgage finance 
suppliers and agents.
   b. Regulatory authorities should establish procedures 
for vetting mortgage product advertising, with the 
capacity to force advertising to be reviewed or 
withdrawn, before transmission, to ensure a quality 
information environment for decision making about 
mortgage products.
   c. Mortgage finance contracts should be independently 
inspected and commented on by accredited financial 
advisers prior to conclusion.
   d. A typical intervention would involve a one-
hour documentary inspection and preparation 
of commentary and a one-hour client briefing if 
considered necessary. Accredited financial advisers 
should be drawn from suitably qualified persons with 
a variety of social and cultural backgrounds, including 
from the pool of financial counsellors employed by 
charity organisations and other NGOs.
   e. A suitably resourced public agency should team 
with accredited financial advisers to coordinate and fill 
gaps in the supply of educational and other information 
resources to assist potential borrowers make informed 
decisions concerning mortgage products. Materials 
should be available face-to-face and on-line and be 
targeted at potentially vulnerable and information poor 
groups.
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Figure 1.1 Proportion of mortgages with 30+ days arrears by postal area, 30 September 2008
1 This report uses the term ‘Western Sydney’ to refer to the Local Government Areas of: Hawkesbury, Baulkham Hills, Blacktown, Parramatta, Holroyd, Fairfield, 
Bankstown, Liverpool, Camden, Campbelltown, Wollondilly, and the Blue Mountains.
Mortgage distress is affecting a growing number of Australian 
households. Distress ranges from arrears in mortgage 
payments to defaults, foreclosures and repossessions. 
The impacts of mortgage distress are complex and include 
issues relating to the ongoing financial viability of the affected 
households, wider neighbourhood effects, and a range of 
psychological and social impacts. In recent years, mortgage 
stress has had a consistently higher prevalence in certain parts 
of Western Sydney1 than in any other region across Australia.
Existing studies show that the incidence of mortgage distress 
is strongly influenced by the initial size of a mortgage relative 
to household income, especially if the mortgage was secured 
more recently. The incidence of mortgage distress is also 
strongly influenced by income-disrupting events including illness 
or injury to a key household income earner; the experience of 
unemployment, reduced working hours or unpaid maternity 
leave; and by a family break-up event. It should be recognised 
that the chances of these events occurring – especially 
disruptions to incomes – are greater in the sub-regions of 
Sydney that are characterised by lower socio-economic status 
and by higher migrant intake rates. Not surprising, then, the 
combination of a downturn in economic activity in Sydney since 
around the mid-2000s, episodes of frequent interest rate rises, 
and higher levels of borrowing in an inflated housing market, 
generated high concentrations of mortgage distress the region.
Recognition of rising levels of mortgage distress in the mid to 
late 2000s led the research team to commence investigations 
into the nature and incidence of mortgage distress. Since the 
investigation commenced in mid-2008, mortgage-borrowing 
experiences have been further influenced by global financial 
crisis and recession and subsequently by dramatic reductions 
and rises in interest rates charged on mortgage borrowing. 
This report presents the findings of investigations conducted 
throughout these dramatic events. It focuses in particular on 
the experiences of household affected by mortgage distress. 
Not surprisingly, the study faced interesting and anticipated 
challenges. At one level, as described, the macro-parameters 
affecting mortgage borrowing changed markedly throughout 
INTRODUCTION01
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the course of the study. At a different level, the study was 
forced to confront the difficulties of recruiting participants who 
were experiencing severe financial and social problems, which 
were generating significant loneliness and isolation, and which 
thereby militated against any willingness to be involved in the 
study. 
The intensive efforts needed, then, to secure participants in this 
study cannot be underemphasised. Perseverance in recruiting, 
however, has led to the capture of revealing and, at times, 
distressing stories of hardship, perseverance and, unfortunately, 
of devastating outcomes.
Following this introduction, the next chapter provides a 
commentary on the geographic aspects of mortgage distress 
in Australia and identifies Western Sydney as the place that 
has been most significantly affected in recent years by the 
phenomenon. Chapter 3 then discusses key financial aspects 
surrounding the issue of mortgage distress. The chapter gives 
consideration to the issue of the distribution of financial risk 
in the contemporary financial system especially the elevated 
role of the household in holding and ameliorating financial risk. 
Chapter 4 explores the different definitions of mortgage distress 
including those developed by rating agencies and in academic 
research. Chapter 5 examines the social and cultural aspects 
related to mortgage borrowing and distress. The chapter also 
investigates the way information about mortgage products 
is supplied to the potential borrower, and the influence of the 
personal circumstances of borrowers and their aspirations on 
mortgage acquisition and subsequent repayment behaviour. 
Chapter 6 outlines the research design and methodology 
undertaken for the collection of data about borrowing and 
mortgage distress in Western Sydney. Chapter 7 presents 
a summary of findings from the survey. Chapter 8 presents 
extracts from the personal stories of research participants while 
chapter 9 presents the findings from the in-depth interview 
phase of the study and the analysis of the issues that lead 
households into mortgage distress. Chapter 10 presents a 
general discussion of mortgage distress and makes concluding 
remarks. Lastly, chapter 11 presents policy recommendations 
and implications.
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THE GEOGRAPHICAL INCIDENCE 
OF MORTGAGE DISTRESS02
The complex question of mortgage distress requires an 
understanding of intersecting issues relating to:
• access to housing finance,
• house-price inflation,
• rising income and wealth, and
•  changes in housing demand arising from shifts in lifestyle 
and aspiration.
These questions are reviewed for the Australian context in 
Berry (2010); Berry, Dalton, & Nelson (2009); Berry, Dalton, 
Engels, & Whiting (1999); House of Representatives (2007, 
2008), La Cava and Simon (2003), Yates & Milligan (2007), 
and Allon (2008), and for overseas by many including Smith 
(2009); Wyly et al. (2007); and Wyly et al. (2009).
In brief, easier access to finance in Australia over the last 
decade has enabled once excluded householders to secure 
mortgage finance. By definition, this group has included 
people whose financial circumstances and histories meant 
that they failed to satisfy either the standards or the criteria to 
qualify for a loan. Of course, there are specific individual and 
household scale consequences when mortgage distress and 
defaulting arise. There are also significant neighbourhood and 
sub-regional property market implications. It is these that are 
the focus of this chapter.
There are established understandings about of the 
composition of cities that tell us how households become 
concentrated into different suburbs. The most important 
drivers of urban concentrations are socio-economic status 
(especially income), demography (especially life cycle stage) 
and cultural characteristics (especially ethnicity) (Kaplan, 
Wheeler, & Holloway 2004). Often, these characteristics 
coincide geographically. Lower income households are 
more likely to live in Sydney’s western suburbs since, by 
definition, these households are less able to compete for 
housing located in more desired locations. Lower incomes 
usually arise from having lesser or unrecognised occupational 
skills, from limited workplace experience, and from poor 
communication skills. Members of new migrant communities 
often demonstrate more than one of these labour market 
characteristics and so are more likely to receive lower 
household incomes; and, therefore, gravitate to cheaper 
housing neighbourhoods in Western Sydney. Likewise  
modest income households with children to support are  
more likely to be found in the lower-cost housing areas of 
Western Sydney.
Every city’s housing market reflects such neighbourhood 
differentiation, but Sydney’s housing market probably more 
than most because of its relatively fixed supply of housing 
in the leafy northern suburbs, and in the much sought after 
beach and harbourside suburbs in the east and inner city. 
It is important to note that easier available mortgage finance 
enabled lower income households to become home purchasers. 
Within Sydney, this meant that many groups previously 
excluded from access to mortgage finance became borrowers 
of significant sums of money. As defined above, these groups 
included those with less secure attachments to labour markets, 
lower-income new migrant groups and household with budgets 
stretched by the presence of children. It is reasonable to 
presume that all these groups of new borrowers came from 
neighbourhoods with previously lower rates of owner-occupied 
and mortgage-occupied households. In these neighbourhoods, 
therefore, an easing of the conditions for gaining access to 
mortgage finance produced rising numbers of householders 
with approved mortgage access in areas where there was a 
higher-than-average supply of cheaper, available housing.
The good sense of a transfer of large numbers of households 
from renter to home-buyer status relied on a continuation 
of many factors. These included ready access to secure 
employment, and protection from the income-disruptive effects 
of sickness and maternity leave. The good sense also relied 
on the guarantee that the value of the dwelling transacted as a 
result of the mortgage contract would not fall to the extent that 
a borrower might judge that continuing to repay the mortgage 
was not worthwhile.
As we now know from US experience, where a number of 
borrowers default on their mortgages, or decide to leave their 
properties because of repayment difficulties, then a downward 
housing price spiral is induced. Prolonged and significant house 
price deflation induces further mortgage severance as capable 
and disciplined borrowers dispose of ‘underwater’ mortgages, 
that is, those where total amounts owning exceed market value 
of the property.
There is no evidence to date in Australia of such second-
level effects of mortgage distress. In the USA, though, these 
second-level neighbourhood and district effects have become 
pronounced.
THE US EXPERIENCE OF MORTGAGE 
DEFAULTING
Emerging research shows the extent of neighbourhood 
concentrations of new borrowing and subsequent defaulting 
in many US cities. Wyly (2007; 2009) and Immergluck (2008) 
among many others observe how subprime lending was 
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disproportionately concentrated among racial and ethnic 
minority households and neighbourhoods. In a climate of 
steadily rising home values, says Wyly (2009), even the worst 
risk assessment processes and lending practices yielded 
satisfactory investment outcomes for borrowers and lenders, 
with defaulters readily processed through re-financing or 
distress sales without need for foreclosure.
Housing markets in neighbourhoods with high concentrations 
of sub-prime mortgages, however, produced alarming negative 
outcomes from about the second half of 2007. As poorly 
regulated labour markets faltered in a new context of slowing 
economic growth, many households experienced difficulty 
meeting mortgage repayments. Then as housing prices 
fell – arising from a halt in new housing demand alongside 
continued input of new-built housing stock – the numbers 
of defaults and foreclosures increased dramatically. We now 
know that neighbourhood after neighbourhood passed tipping 
points where not just defaulting mortgagors walked away from 
houses now worth considerably less than contracted value, 
householders without histories of arrears also walked away 
from mortgages as equity slipped into negative territory.
The geographic variation in the experience of mortgage 
defaulting across US cities is instructive. A summary of the US 
experience is available from Crump et al. (2010). The research 
reveals the following:
•  In districts with high rates of sub-prime mortgage lending 
that suffered little house price deflation, there has been 
significantly lower rates of mortgage defaulting. These 
districts are more likely to be found in the so-called “gulf 
states”, the states around the Gulf of Mexico, especially 
Louisiana and Texas, where regional economies have been 
more resilient and increases in unemployment less severe.
•  In inner parts of the older industrial cities, especially in 
Minnesota, Michigan and Ohio, where sub-prime lending 
intersected strongly with African-American communities, 
and where recession and unemployment have been 
pronounced, there have been widespread defaulting, 
foreclosure and walkaways. Inner city housing markets in 
cities like Minneapolis and Toledo, for instance, and in parts 
of Chicago, have ceased to function as market instruments 
due to the large number of vacant properties for sale, many 
of which have fallen into disrepair.
•  In the so called “inland empires” of California and Nevada, 
the sites of much new housing construction in the 2000s, 
a new-build boom fed by accessible finance, there have 
been large scale foreclosures and walkaways. Both the 
Californian and Nevada economies are very high rates 
of unemployment, compounded by severe downturn in 
construction sector, long since a source of economic 
stimulus in these states. The combined impacts of 
foreclosure and walkaways, general economic downturn 
and specific construction sector gloom have caused 
significant housing price falls and ongoing low turnover in 
housing markets generally.
THE AUSTRALIAN GEOGRAPHIC 
EXPERIENCE OF MORTGAGE ARREARS
Unlike in the USA, large scale mortgage defaulting 
concentrated in particular neighbourhoods has been avoided 
throughout Australia. Household debt levels among lower 
income households has been contained; predatory lending 
practices were uncommon; housing price falls have been 
modest and contained; and the nation’s labour market 
downturn has not been severe. A US-style snowballing of 
mortgage defaulting and walkaways has thus been avoided in 
Australia.
The main data source for examination of the geography of 
mortgage distress in Australia is the structured finance reports 
from Fitch Ratings (2008; 2009). The Fitch Ratings reports 
process data from Australian home loans that have been 
financed through securitisation. The September 2009 Fitch 
Ratings report surveyed about 730,000 loans totalling over 
A$118 billion in balances, an estimated 12% of the total value 
of housing loan stock in Australia. As such the data is seen 
to provide strong representation of the performance of the 
Australian residential housing sector.
The Fitch Ratings data are used here to help identify those 
areas where mortgage distress is likely to be concentrated 
geographically. This knowledge was important for locating and 
recruiting respondents for the study’s data collection exercises.
Table 2.1 shows the 20 worst performing regions as shown by 
the Fitch Ratings ranking of mortgage performance by region 
in Australia for 30 September 2008, which was the data used 
to guide the study’s search for respondents. It also shows data 
for 30 September 2009, data which were released after our 
field studies were concluded. These data are included here for 
enrichment purposes.
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Fairfield - Liverpool 
Gosford - Wyong 
Outer South Western Sydney 
Outer Western Sydney 
Newcastle 
Central Western Sydney 
Wollongong 
Blacktown 
Canterbury - Bankstown 
Gold Coast East 
Gold Coast West 
East Metropolitan 
South Eastern Outer Melbourne 
Melton - Wyndham 
Sunshine Coast 
Central Northern Sydney 
South West Metropolitan 
Caboolture Shire 
Northern Beaches 
Northern Outer Melbourne 
Inner Western Sydney 
Greater Hobart 
Eastern Suburbs 
St George - Sutherland 



































































































Source: Compiled from Fitch Ratings 2008, 2009
The table reveals the higher-than-average incidence of 
mortgage arrears in Western Sydney. Six of Australia’s ten 
poorest performing regions in terms of mortgage delinquency 
were located in Western Sydney in September 2009. These 
regions were (with their September 2008 and September 2009 
ranks shown in brackets) Fairfield-Liverpool (1, 4), Outer South 
Western Sydney (3, 8) Outer Western Sydney (4, 2), Central 
Western Sydney (6, 14), Blacktown (8, 6) and Canterbury-
Bankstown (9, 5).
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Table 2.2 shows unemployment rates and arrears rates 
for these poorly performing Western Sydney regions. The 
unemployment rates are derived from ABS Labour Survey data 
(not seasonally adjusted). Corresponding regional data are not 
available for the Outer Western Sydney and Blacktown regions 
and so these are marked n.a. (not available).
The table reveals the high correlation between mortgage 
delinquency and regional unemployment (measuring r = 0.95 
in September 2008). Each of the six Western Sydney regions 
has an unemployment rate significantly above both state and 
national averages. In September 2008, the state and national 
unemployment rates were 4.6% and 4.0% respectively. In 
September 2009 they were 5.6% and 5.5%. As is discussed 
elsewhere in this report, interruptions to income are a significant 
cause of mortgage distress. The data from these tables, then, 
indicate a significant degree of likelihood that high degrees of 
mortgage distress in the six poorest performing Sydney regions 
in terms of mortgage delinquency have a close relationship to 
the poor regional labour market conditions.
Yet, these poor labour market conditions, which no doubt have 
subjected the budgets of many mortgage-holding households 
to severe stress, haven’t generated large-scale mortgage 
defaulting; nor, subsequently, have these areas experienced 
widespread, significant house price deflation, the critical 
ingredient to housing market failure in many US cities, as we 
have seen.
The next chapter examines the financial context of mortgage 
distress, especially the risk shifting to households seen as 
underpinning both householders’ quest for housing equity 
but also their vulnerability to mortgage distress and default. It 
shows that Australian households are increasingly responsible 
for the assessment and containment of financial risk. The 
desirability of this aside, Australian households’ capacity to 
handle financial risk, even in time of severe economic stress, 
seems to have been a major factor in containing housing 
market failure. This capacity is discussed in chapter 5.
Region
Fairfield - Liverpool 
Outer South Western Sydney 
Outer Western Sydney 
Central Western Sydney 
Blacktown 
Canterbury - Bankstown 
30 Day Arrears































Source: Compiled from Fitch Ratings 2008, 2009
Table 2.2 Western Sydney regions showing 30+ Day Arrears, and unemployment, September 2008, 2009
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THE FINANCIAL CONTEXT   
OF MORTGAGE DISTRESS03
As is explained in detail in subsequent chapters, financial 
distress associated with the pressures of meeting mortgage 
repayments has its origins in particular circumstances with 
differential with impacts on individuals and households. 
However, we can also point to more general trends and 
processes that weigh heavily on the issue of mortgage 
distress, particularly when concentrations of mortgage distress 
become capable of threatening financial stability at wider 
economic and institutional levels. This chapter explores these 
wider concerns.
In its April 2005 Financial Stability Report, the International 
Monetary Fund (2005: 89) made a striking statement about 
the role of households in global financial markets:
  “Overall, there has been a transfer of financial risk over 
a number of years, away from the banking sector to 
non-banking sectors, be they financial or the household 
sector. This dispersion of risk has made the financial 
system more resilient, not the least because the 
household sector is acting more as a “shock absorber of 
last resort”.
 
Three years later, as the global financial crisis rolled out, 
the IMF’s focus on the links between financial system risk 
and the ability of the household sector to absorb systemic 
shocks proved prescient; although the IMF’s account of the 
nature and direction of these links was rather inaccurate. The 
sensitivity of financial markets to the falling value of mortgage-
backed securities revealed the limitations of households 
as financial risk absorbers. Starkly, it became clear that the 
financial behaviours of households were a social as well as an 
actuarial issue.
The general issue raised by the IMF, however, prompts 
consideration for two dimensions of mortgage stress: the 
process of systematic risk shifting towards households; and the 
ways risks are shifted and managed within households.
RISK SHIFTING TO HOUSEHOLDS
The proportion of household income committed to 
homeownership has been rising steadily in Australia, as in many 
other nations. There is contested research on the extent to this 
increasing proportion is due to falling in housing affordability, 
or to rising home ownership aspirations, or to the funding of 
home renovations through mortgage loans, or to increased 
interest in mortgage-based investments. One consensus is that 
all of these are contributing factors (Battelino 2008; Richards 
2009). In any event, the rising level of commitment is directly 
associated with increased levels of mortgage distress across all 
sections of society. For first home buyers, Chris Lamont (2008) 
of the Housing Industry Association notes that:
  “…one in every two first homebuyers faces mortgage 
stress and the house price to income ratio is now 
approaching 9.1 compared with 5.3 in 1997” (2008, 
p. 194)
Yates suggests that this is in fact part of a longer and more 
general trend:
  “Between 1960 and 2006 real house prices increased 
at an average of 2.7 per cent per annum, ahead of a 
1.9 per cent per annum growth in per household real 
incomes” (2008, p. 200)
Clearly then, one of the major contributors to mortgage 
stress – rising spending on mortgage repayments in a context 
of declining housing affordability – has been high and rising 
throughout Australia, although the path from increased risk 
to servicing difficulties, repayment default, or other forms of 
financial stress, is contingent on movements in incomes and 
financing costs with details largely unknown.
We do know, though, that the household is increasingly 
responsible for managing its financial exposures, in the context 
of a withdrawal of risk protection of households in many 
domains by governments and state genesis (Calder 1999). 
Governments were once the major protector of incomes, for 
example, via its administration of a system of industrial awards 
and by guaranteed entitlements to unemployment and sickness 
benefits. Yet employment contracts in Australia have become 
more flexible with employees having certainty about income 
flows. There is also a raised level of responsibility for financial 
provisioning at the household scale for medical and education 
needs and for superannuation savings. In the latter, there is a 
growing responsibility on unit holders to choose investment 
portfolios based on selected risk profiles. Such developments 
can be seen as a general process of risks shifting to 
households, exemplars of the IMF’s depiction of households as 
shock absorbers of last resort.
In respect of household financial behaviours, rising 
marketisation and competitiveness within the financial sector in 
the last three decades have seen households needing to make 
increasingly sophisticated decisions about financial products. 
In home purchasing, households take decisions about the 
proportion of (expected) income to dedicate to mortgage 
payments, the time profile of loans, the choice between fixed or 
floating rate loans and other interest rate options, intersections 
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Figure 3.1 Household Debt Components, Australia 1990 – 2008
Data Source: RBA Bulletin Statistical Tables B21 and D02, ABS 2009
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with other consumer credit options and other accounts held 
with a financial institution, and so on. In each calculation, there 
are better and worse choices – but these are only knowable 
retrospectively – requiring the household to be financially savvy, 
to know how to evaluate the range of financial risk exposures 
and how to manage them.
These decisions apply to both owner-occupied and investor 
housing. Figure 3.1 shows the dominance of owner-occupied 
housing within household debt, and that the share of investor 
housing has been growing.
Investor housing reflects the expectations of Australians to 
accumulate assets for retirement. Owner-occupied housing 
occupies an important position in the risk-shifting process, 
although it is an ambiguous position (Hacker 2006). The 
securitisation of mortgages has enabled housing to be 
transformed into a highly liquid asset on financial markets. 
Yet for most households, while housing is the single largest 
asset, it is a relatively illiquid asset since it is the place where 
a household lives. Households thus hold their main stock 
of wealth – the house – as an illiquid asset with the debt 
obligations behind the house – the mortgage – circulating in 
financial markets where asset liquidity is an important quality. 
Should personal or wider financial crisis occur, households 
can be stuck, holding a fixed financial position. This has been 
demonstrated starkly in the United States, where falling house 
prices translated as un-hedged losses of wealth for vast 
numbers of households, in many cases producing household 
insolvency. In Australia, where house prices have been more 
resilient, the illiquidity of the house as an asset class has not 
been damaging to households, although this is not uniformly 
the case; and in certain suburbs, and especially in western 
Sydney, falling house prices seem to have been the source of 
some household insolvency.
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Figure 3.2 Ratio of household debt to household income, Australia, 1985-2009 
Note: The household sector excludes unincorporated enterprises. Household disposable income is after tax and before the deduction of interest payments.
Source: Davies 2009, p.20 
RISK-SHIFTING AND HOUSEHOLD DEBT
The incentive for Australians to purchase a housing property 
has become stronger for many reasons. Chapter 5 examines 
the socio-cultural reasons behind the desire for home 
ownership. There are also compelling financial reasons, 
including that households have had to become more reliant 
on private assets capable of conversion to income for old age. 
Alongside rising savings in superannuation assets, housing 
is seen as a prime investment asset capable of delivering 
retirement income, and not simply something that delivers 
a housing service. The rise in the ratio of household debt to 
household income reflects this perception. Research shows 
that this ratio has increased from 100% in 2000 to 157% at the 
beginning of 2008, before falling slightly (Davies 2009, p19-20) 
with nearly all the growth in the ratio attributable to increased 
housing debt, as shown in Figure 3.2. 
The general presumption of Australian households, like 
households in many developed nations, was that housing was 
a secure asset class. The global financial crisis and the US 
sub-prime crisis have demonstrated, however, that housing 
value is susceptible to erosion, just like other asset classes 
and financial products. Moreover, the events surrounding the 
global financial crisis and recession demonstrate the close 
relationships between the market value of housing assets and 
the value of financial products in general, and that fluctuation in 
the value of one correlates closely with fluctuations in the value 
of the other. Moreover, we can now observe that heightened 
levels of household-based mortgage distress can significantly 
affect general financial stress; and that there are feedback 
effects from financial markets, such as through fluctuating asset 
values and shifts in interest rates, that bear directly on levels 
of household mortgage stress. In other words, acquisition and 
management of a mortgage is no longer simply a household 
education and private behaviour matter.
Knowledge of the dynamics of the relationship between 
systemic and household financial risk, however, is insufficient 
to explain mortgage stress at any point in time, or the likelihood 
of particular individuals to experience mortgage stress. 
Nonetheless, a tendency to increase the rate of lending to 
households carries some inevitable increase in risk, particularly 
for lower wealth and income borrowers, albeit within bounds 
that appear entirely consistent with financial institution 
conventions of risk management.
In lending practice, there has been a shift away from the use 
of debt servicing ratios (See Chapter 4) in favour of net income 
surplus assessment models. As described by John Laker, 
Chairman of the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
(APRA) (2007 p.3):
  “These models require the borrower to have a minimum 
surplus of net after-tax income after taking into account 
debt servicing, other fixed payments and a basic level 
of living expenses. In contrast to the debt servicing 
ratio method, these expenses do not vary with the 
borrower’s income. . . At the same time, net income 
surplus models can in principle allow a higher level 
of borrowing than the debt servicing ratio method for 
borrowers with the same characteristics”. 
The task for lenders and regulators then is the calculation of 
ability to pay within the net income surplus framework (Persson 
2009). The immediate issue for lenders is the calculation of 
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basic living expenses for households, the remainder perceived 
as the ‘surplus’ potentially available for debt-servicing. Laker 
(2007) explains:
  “[M]ost ADIs [authorised deposit-taking institutions] 
use either the Henderson Poverty Index (HPI) or (the 
higher) Household Expenditure Survey (HES) data 
from the Australian Bureau of Statistics as the basis 
for their living expense calculations. Around 20 per 
cent of ADIs add a margin to these calculations 
to account for error in the estimates. Our review 
indicated that many lenders were, at the time, using 
estimates of living expenses below the HPI or were 
not regularly updating their estimates”. (Emphasis 
added) 
The use of net income surplus models enabled a widening 
of the pool of potential borrowers of housing finance and the 
amounts borrowers could be lent, but at the costs of increasing 
other risks. For example, within a net income surplus loans 
assessment framework:
•  households could potentially commit to mortgage 
repayments to the point where their level of basic needs 
consumption is driven downwards toward a socially-
constituted poverty line; 
•  households could substitute mortgage repayments for 
payments for other payments which would diminish 
household risks, for example, payments for health 
insurance, car insurance, and income protection; and
•  households could access alternative sources of credit, such 
as via credit cards, to maintain a certain desired level of 
consumption.
The raised possibility, then, is that circumstances of ill health, 
unemployment, or even car breakdown, can have a substantial 
negative effect on a household’s capacity to meet mortgage 
repayments.
Stress-testing on such scenarios is now common though for 
the purpose of credit risk management of financial institutions 
rather than for concerns about the personal circumstances of 
borrowers. One of the lessons for Australia of the US sub-
prime crisis beyond lessons for the management of institutional 
risk, where Australian institutions have performed better than 
elsewhere, is that individual experiences of financial hardship 
cannot be summarised or predicted by aggregated actuarial 
calculations. On the one hand, we can now see that the 
qualities of household assets as well as the motivations and 
methods of household decision making do not mirror assets 
and behaviours of financial markets. On the other hand, 
we now know that there is a direct link between household 
financial behaviours and the risk decision making management 
of risk. An evaluation of risk must, in summary, recognise the 
dilemma that for the household, housing is an illiquid asset, and 
the way households manage that asset is unlikely to comply 
with conventional risk management models.
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A high incidence of mortgage stress has been reported in 
Australia from at least the early 2000s. Recent evidence 
suggests that across all loan types around 17,000 borrowers 
are 90 or more days in arrears (Reserve Bank of Australia 
2008). 
 
One precondition for rising mortgage stress has been growing 
household debt relative to income levels. As at 2000, Genworth 
data identified the ratio of total household debt to disposable 
income to be 96.6 per cent; by 2007 this had climbed to 160.4 
per cent. In other words, the average Australian household now 
owes approximately $160 in debt, for every $100 in disposable 
income (Genworth Financial 2008). Most of this debt was 
unsecured (58 per cent was credit card debt). Mortgage and 
personal loan debt represented 39 per cent and 18 per cent 
respectively (Genworth Financial 2008).2
These data demonstrate that households experience two 
related types of stress: financial stress refers to the broader 
pressures on household budget arising from debt repayment 
obligations while mortgage stress refers to the problems arising 
from mortgage repayment obligations in particular. Hence while 
financial stress is a wider category than mortgage stress, it 
must be recognised that the two are closely related, albeit in 
ways that are difficult to pre-determine. Case studies later in 
this report, however, provide insights into the connections.
As interactions between the financial sector and households 
intensify, the sources, risks and extent of financial stress 
change. Obviously, there is not a clear distinction between 
mortgage stress and financial stress. 
The definition of mortgage stress varies according to its use: 
whether mortgage stress is being defined and measured to 
inform different aspects of government economic and social 
policy; to rate the risk of mortgage backed securities; to 
estimate the mortgage insurance implications of repayment 
default trends; or to consider the soundness and stability of the 
banking system. The different agendas at stake in mortgage 
stress mean that a range of definitions and associated 
measurements exist. A starting point in considering the 
empirical accounts of stress is to acknowledge the different 
range of interests involved.
The following sections tackle the definitions of mortgage stress, 
looking at its causes, its quantification, and the criteria used in 
its measurement by a range of institutions.
CAUSES OF MORTGAGE STRESS
Financial and mortgage stress tend to be concentrated 
among those households3  with at least one of the following 
characteristics (Breunig & Cobb-Clark 2006; Headey 2007; 
Headey et.al 2005; Marks 2007): 
• lower income
• high initial loan to value ratio
• recent purchasers of home
• low assets/wealth
•  lower labour market participation (especially due to 
unemployment)
• jobs of lower occupational status
• lone parents
• young children
•  in low SES areas, especially those in areas with low or slow 
rates of economic growth
•  have experienced a significant change in household income 
or costs esp. due to job loss, significant health issue or 
relationship breakdown
• loan supplied in low doc form
Despite the list of potential sources or attributes of stress, it 
is important at this point to caution against a conclusion that 
simply attributes financial and mortgage stress to poverty and/
or disadvantage. Financial and mortgage stress is much more 
mainstream.4 Rather, financial stress can be thought of as 
coming from the growing financialisation of life across the range 
of household types, as was elaborated in chapter 3. 
2  It bears noting at this point that about two thirds of Australian households have no mortgage debt, either because their housing tenure is via rented 
accommodation, or because the household owns their home outright. The issue of interest here is those (one third of all) households with mortgage debt. 
3  Adding complexity is that the term ‘household’ is changing in its meaning. There has been an increasing fragmentation of household types, depending on 
family structure, demographic attributes, labour market experience (wage and labour contracting type along with the better known widening income disparities), 
the significance of other fixed costs such as childcare, and so on.
4  If for no other reason that it excludes those people living in rental accommodation, a group with a much higher proportion of people living with low income and 
other attributes of disadvantage.
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BENCHMARKS OF INDIVIDUAL STRESS
National Housing Inquiry (1990) and the National Housing 
Strategy (1991) have been highly influential in shaping 
understandings of what represents housing stress, and thereby 
the evaluation of mortgage stress.5  
The National Housing Strategy proposed a 30% repayment 
threshold as an indicator of housing stress, that is, where 
the costs of housing (repayments, rent) exceed 30% of 
household income.6 The 30% figure is adjusted for income 
range by the Ontario or 30/40 rule where the stress threshold 
of 30% is confined to the bottom 40% of households by 
income distribution. This adjustment excludes higher income 
households who have the capacity to service higher debt 
to income ratios without experiencing undue hardship. High 
income earners in particular who invest heavily in housing could 
exceed the 30% threshold but still have sufficient disposable 
income to service a mortgage in times of hardship (Stevens 
2008), or have the option of down-sizing their housing without 
the need to leave home ownership completely.
The 30% benchmark has featured in state housing policy 
including in calculations of public housing need and rent 
assistance (e.g. NSW Department of Housing 20087) as well as 
in academic and policy studies of housing stress. For example, 
in applying the 30% threshold, a AMP/NATSEM study (Tanton, 
Nepal & Harding 2008) identifies the following economically 
vulnerable groups:
•  first home buyers are the most vulnerable to housing stress, 
with 62% of first home buyers exceeding the 30 per cent 
threshold;
•  one third of sole parent households and single person 
households are also in a state of housing stress;
•  couple households show risk of housing stress with only 
15% of couple households above the 30% threshold.8
The use of benchmarks to define housing stress are 
increasingly contested however. Marks & Sedgwick (2008), for 
instance, see the benchmarks as “essentially arbitrary” with 
different households having markedly different capacities to 
cope with different housing cost ratios. There is also a growing 
argument that the 30% rule does not reflect the profoundly 
different profile of the Australian housing market that has 
emerged in the post 1990s period where among other things 
spatial access to services and amenity increasingly affects 
household expenditure patterns, meaning housing expenditure 
can substitute for other household expenditure categories, 
and so exceed the 30% threshold without further stressing a 
household budget.
Higher income growth over the past decade generally across 
the population “has allowed households to devote a larger 
proportion of their income to housing, while still maintaining 
their living standards more generally” (Battellino 2008). People 
expecting income growth can reasonably exceed 30% housing 
costs in the short run. In addition, purchasing a dwelling can 
reasonably include forced retirement savings, especially for 
higher income households (Senate Select Committee 2008, p. 
37). Moreover, the prevalence of high gearing among younger 
households is associated increasing participation by those 
households in the paid labour market in terms of number of 
jobs, hours worked and delayed child bearing (Richards 2009). 
A consequence of the failure of analyses to coalesce around 
the 30% rule is the emergence of a variety of alterative 
measures. Some commentators and statisticians challenge 
the notion that stress can be denominated as known threshold 
proportion of income. Fujitsu consulting, for instance, argues 
that a “...higher proportion of gross income spent on mortgage 
repayments is a necessary, but not sufficient condition towards 
mortgage stress.” Fujitsu advocates a segmented analysis of 
the data (on proportion of income repayments and household 
type) to identify the income bands where stress points are likely 
to exist (Fujitsu Consulting & JP Morgan 2007). 
Others, observing that the 30% rule has been a poor indicator 
of actual mortgage defaults, have developed measures of 
mortgage stress that do not rely at all on income thresholds. 
Fitch, Moodys and others, for instance, prefer to use trend 
data on mortgage arrears, using different lengths of arrears and 
forms of disaggregation. 
A RANGE OF CRITERIA
Mortgage stress, therefore, is increasingly measured in a 
number of ways ranging from statistical financial measures 
at the national level (e.g. debt to income ratios, debt service 
ratios), to household specific statistical data (such as 
loan arrears, defaults or likely defaults, repossessions), to 
surveys of households of their perceived capacity to meet 
mortgage payments or the adjustments households make to 
consumption in favour of meeting debt repayments. Here, we 
identify the criteria adopted by 6 monitoring agencies, made 
up of four credit rating institutions (Fitch, Fujitsu Consulting, 
Genworth, and Moodys) and two government funded research 
agencies (NATSEM and HILDA).
5 According to the NSW Department of Housing, the term ‘housing stress’ was first used in Australia by the National Housing Strategy (1991/92) to refer to 
lower income households with high housing costs.
6 As a recent Senate inquiry on housing affordability notes, the 30 per cent threshold became the influential and long standing benchmark for understandings of 
housing stress (Senate 2008: 35).
7 This report uses a broader measure than the Ontario rule. It considers a group of households who have gross incomes below 120% of the median household 
income and who are paying more than 30% of their household income to meet their housing costs
8 More comprehensive studies conducted by NATSEM further define the characteristics of households likely to experience housing stress. These are single 
parent families, families where the head is aged 30-39 years, and buyers or renters located in NSW (NATSEM 2004). An APRA survey of owner occupier debt 
found that the median debt servicing ratio for owner-occupier housing lending was 21 per cent. Over a quarter of new loans were provided at ratios above 30 
per cent. Only 9 per cent of these new loans had ratios greater than 40 per cent (APRA 2008).
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Attitudinal/experiences – survey (“Stress-o-
Meter”) and analysis of credit data with JP 
Morgan 
Default or likely default (2000 adults 
surveyed annually)
Missed a payment/loan arrears
Loan delinquency 
>30 per cent of income used to meet 
housing costs defined as meeting ‘housing 
stress’ criteria 
Attitudinal/experiences – survey (mortgage 
difficulties, hardship)
Measurement used
Range of questions rate the 
respondent into two groups:
‘mild stress’ or ‘severe stress’
Broad survey of attitudes and 
experiences with housing
>30, >60, >90 days in arrears for 
securitized mortgages
>30 days & >60 days in payment 
arrears 
ABS survey of income and housing 
(ten year observation period)
Behind schedule on mortgage 
repayment; Could not meet 
repayment; Having to forgo other 
consumption to meet repayments; 
House for sale in last 4 years 
because of difficulty in meeting 
repayments
Causes and evidence
Evidence on arrears and re-
prioritised spending 
Mixed reasons for declining 
affordability and stress
Evidence on arrears in 
securitised mortgages matched 
by postcode 
Data drawn directly from banks 
and lenders (RMBS – prime 
lending market)
Housing costs versus income 
Evidence on reported 
difficulties in meeting or missed 
repayments
Source: Agency websites
While this range of criteria provides a valuable diversity in 
mortgage stress estimation, they also present obstacles to 
comparative and time series analysis. A major problem is 
inconsistency in the use of categories. This is often a failure to 
disaggregate between wealthy and poorer households falling 
into stress categories. Some surveys fail to differentiate between 
mortgage and rental payments, combing them simply as 
‘housing payments.’ Forms of loans are often not disaggregated 
by purpose (e.g. owner-occupier versus investment). Financial 
institutions are required to classify their loans according to 
purpose, but the range of loan products is extensive and it is 
not always clear what specific liabilities debt is being used to 
service. Often mortgage debt is re-financed to consolidate a 
range of other debts, and often this will see borrowers liable 
for significant fees to new lenders (Australian Securities and 
Investment Commission 2008; Hall 2008). It is, therefore, difficult 
to disentangle mortgage debt for from other household debt. 
Another problem of comparison arises from different survey 
techniques. In particular there are differences in the time spreads 
of the measures, and differences between measurement of 
actual arrears and repossessions, versus reported difficulties in 
meeting repayments. As a result, surveys generate divergence 
in the estimated degree of mortgage stress.
CONCLUSION 
There is a range of indicators that show mortgage stress is a 
growing problem. These indicators identify the range of stress 
being experienced, many of the attributes associated with 
stress, and its spatial and demographic distribution. 
In addition, the terrains of the economy and the financial 
market in Australia have been altered in ways that suggest 
the preconditions for mortgage stress are always present, 
but their incidence varies among households over time. Many 
data collection exercises are designed to monitor the effect 
of mortgage stress on the performance of financial products 
(e.g. a mortgage backed security) or on the financial stability of 
lenders, rather than the viability or experiences of borrowers. 
Rarely do data sets capture households that regularly meet 
their mortgage commitments, yet find it more and more difficult 
to do so. Such people may not directly affect banks through 
arrears or defaulting, but they do suffer significantly from 
the pressures of financial stress (Wesley Mission 2009). This 
unrevealed stress is vastly under explored.
It is clear that Australia’s avoidance of the worst effects of the 
global financial crisis has reduced the probability of widespread 
mortgage distress and defaulting. Yet a resumption in house 
price inflation and the subsidised entry of new-home buyers 
into the markets, alongside RBA-led interest rate rises, have 
raised the probability of financial stress in households and 
increased the possibility of higher rates of mortgage arrears and 
defaulting (JP Morgan & Fujitsu 2010).
Of course, the desire for home ownership and the commitment 
to maintaining mortgage commitments are influenced by a 
wider range of social and cultural factors. The following chapter 
explores this broader context of mortgage distress in Australia.
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Owning a home is a goal that powerfully shapes the lives of 
large number of people in Australia. However, purchasing a 
house to live in and, hopefully, pay off and own, is much more 
than a financial decision, it is also a social and cultural ideal 
(Paris 1993; Greig 1995; Allon 2008). Home ownership is a 
powerful force in shaping individual and collective identity. 
Home ownership also plays a major role in forming citizenship 
and national identity. Owning a home is also linked strongly 
to individual virtue and character and identity. Owning or 
purchasing a home is perhaps the most concrete illustration of 
an individual’s commitment to citizenship, the community and 
to the Australian nation.
Historically, Australia has had a high level of home ownership. 
However, a number of important cultural shifts have taken 
place that have served to redefine the so-called dream of 
home ownership in significant ways. Housing is increasingly 
sought after for its prestige and status value with the result 
that rising numbers of home buyers are choosing to buy larger, 
better-appointed and more expensive dwellings. There is also 
increased expenditure on renovations to existing dwellings, 
further driving up household indebtedness (Lowe 2010). The 
combined effect of these housing trends has been to increase 
the proportion of household incomes spent on housing to 
historical highs (Battelino 2009).
The “Australian dream” of home ownership rests on the 
proposition that Australians desire home ownership or  
home buying, over renting. However, there is nothing 
preordained about owner-occupation as a form of tenure 
in Australia or in other advanced societies. Rather than 
being a natural form of expression within a system of free 
choice, home ownership is consistently promoted by 
governments and other authorities over alternative forms of 
housing provision. The sustained, government-led drive to 
encourage home ownership throughout the 20th century 
relied on a construction of the home owner-occupier as an 
enterprising, autonomous and secure citizen. Images of the 
homeowner were contrasted against images of the insecure 
and dependent renter and the public housing tenant who was 
seen to be reliant on the welfare of the state. The identity of 
the homeowner was thus framed in terms of private initiative 
and independence, and defined in opposition to images of 
public reliance and dependency.
The long term preferential treatment given by state and federal 
governments to owner occupation over other tenure forms 
has resulted in an advantaged treatment of the family home 
for tax purposes on one hand, and a smaller, residualised 
social housing sector on the other generous first-home-
buyer assistance encourages both young and lower income 
households into home ownership. And as we have seen in 
chapter 3, increased pressure on households to achieve self-
funded retirement drives an eclectic housing investment sector 
and a tendency towards short-term and less-secure rental-
lease arrangements and, often, substandard or inappropriate 
housing quality and services, particularly for more vulnerable 
households.
The owner-occupied home, then, is being re-cast as a 
vehicle for wealth creation that can be leveraged for further 
consumption and investment. In this sense, homes are no 
longer simply properties to own and occupy, and the means 
to demonstrate upstanding citizenship, and community and 
national belonging. Its role is being extended in explicitly 
financial terms as an asset, an investment, a store of wealth. 
This shift in the culture of housing and home to incorporate 
a wider investment culture marries with the shifts described 
in chapter 3 where the individual household is assumed to 
be increasingly autonomous, responsible for the security 
and welfare of its members, with an accompanying de-
collectivisation of responsibility for risk. Although home 
ownership has generally been seen as a sound financial 
investment, this quality has generally been seen as secondary 
to the benefits of having a guaranteed entitlement to a place to 
live. Contemporary trends suggest, however, that homeowners 
and buyers are increasingly conscious of the investment returns 
that can be derived from mortgage-based investments, and 
are regarding purchasing a dwelling as an entrepreneurial and 
financial strategy as much as a way of addressing a housing 
need. In 2004, for example, The Productivity Commission into 
First Home Ownership found that “...the aggressive marketing 
of housing investment opportunities” was a key contributor to 
Australian house price inflation as well as to levels of household 
indebtedness (Productivity Commission 2004). 
In addition to increasingly viewing their homes as stores of 
wealth able to be unlocked as required, homeowners depend 
on investment returns from their homes in other ways. They 
see housing wealth as a form of self-insurance, and as a future 
supplement to retirement income, or as income insurance in 
general. Yet, as we have seen in chapters 3 and 4, there are 
risks to households of assuming house price appreciation 
either as a form of asset-based security insurance, or as debt-
leveraged investment.
Whether the desire for home ownership is driven by the want 
for security of tenure, the establishment of a retirement asset 
or the pursuit of investment gains, the elevation of home 
ownership as having irrefutable logic bears most heavily on the 
more vulnerable members of our society. It is no surprise that 
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mortgage distress arose earlier and in larger numbers in lower 
socio-economic areas. As described in chapter 2, housing 
distress in Sydney was most visible in an arc across the 
culturally diverse, lower socio-economic communities stretching 
from Bankstown in the south-west, through Fairfield and up 
to Auburn in mid-west Sydney. Chapter 4 has described the 
demographic and economic categories most associated with 
mortgage distress. There are also social and cultural catalysts. 
These catalysts can be divided into three broad but interrelated 
categories: 
• Information deficit
• Changes in personal circumstances
• Aspirational risk
INFORMATION DEFICIT
Information deficit refers to the lack of information for  
optimum decision making. It can arise from poor financial 
literacy and poor understanding of property markets. 
Information deficits are compounded by inadequate 
information provision from financial institutions and related 
agencies. One of our research participants experiencing 
mortgage distress realised that although he had undertaken 
research into mortgage options prior to taking out his home 
loan, he had failed to ask the right questions of his financial 
institution. Low levels of financial literacy mean that decisions 
are often based on incorrect assumptions and beliefs. Broader 
economic parameters, particularly interest rate fluctuations, 
are inadequately assessed leaving householders vulnerable to 
exploitation from mortgage brokers, financial institutions and 
property developers. 
Importantly, inattention to an information deficit comes from the 
nature of property itself with property seen somehow innately 
as a secure investment that, unlike (say) shares, is incapable 
of losing value. The apparent physicality of property unwittingly 
increases trust and disguises risk as in both mortgage and 
investment contracts.
CHANGES IN PERSONAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES
Changes in personal circumstances of households can be 
difficult for individuals to predict and protect against. Yet, as 
we have seen in chapter 3, even minor changes in personal or 
household circumstances can tip a household into mortgage 
distress. The loss of income through illness, the arrival of a 
child or the loss of a job can expose a household to mortgage 
distress. Refinancing mortgages and other debt following family 
breakdown is also a common route into mortgage distress, 
particularly for lower-income females who often attempt to 
keep a family home to lessen the impact relationship break up 
on children. 
Although changes in personal circumstances can affect 
anyone, lower socio-economic households are less likely to 
have assets and resources to draw on when their capacity to 
make mortgage repayments is diminished. 
ASPIRATIONAL RISK
In recent years, the idea of “aspirationalism” has been used 
(often disparagingly) to describe practices over-consumption 
and extravagant asset accumulation (Gwyther 2008). 
Aspirationalism is seen to be linked closely to more accessible 
debt finance, the “democratisation of finance” (Shiller 2003). 
Yet aspirationalism is qualitatively different to the ‘affluenza’ that 
popular commentators have diagnosed. Aspirationalism has 
become embedded in the everyday spaces, practices, activities 
and identities of the household, not just its saving, borrowing 
and investment practices.
Aspirationalism seems to have been prevalent in Australia 
across the range of socio-economic and cultural groupings. 
Its effect on lower income households, however, has been 
especially severe arising from the stagnation of house  
prices in Western Sydney and a slowdown in the area’s 
economy (see chapter 2). Aspirationalism was an important 
factor in influencing all household types to seek larger 
mortgages in the post-1990s period. Yet changed income 
circumstances exposed low income households in particular 
to mortgage stress.
In summary, then, it is important to factor in the social and 
cultural origins of mortgage stress. We see in the chapters 
that follow, how householders’ reactions to mortgage stress in 
recent years have been remarkably different just as outcomes 
and resolutions have been widely different. In the chapter that 
follows, chapter 6, we outline the methods that used to seek 
out participants for our study. The difficulties we encountered 
in the recruitment process should not have been surprising for 
us. At the very least, they confirm the deep commitment to 
the ideal of home ownership that its social and cultural origins 
have instilled.
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The objective of this project is to understand the experiences 
of mortgage distress from the perspective of borrowers in 
the neighbourhoods where there are higher concentrations 
of mortgage distress in Sydney. The study sought to examine 
the reasons for taking up a mortgage, the influence of 
procedures surrounding the mortgage transaction, the factors 
that caused borrowers to struggle to make repayments, the 
coping strategies once in mortgage distress, and the impact of 
mortgage distress on borrowers’ lives. 
The target area for the study, Western Sydney, has been 
identified by the Reserve Bank of Australia and rating agencies 
as the region with the highest concentrations of mortgage 
arrears and defaults. While the experiences of Western Sydney 
are neither homogenous nor necessarily typical of all Australia, 
they were found by the study to be extraordinarily diverse and 
capable of illustrating the problem of mortgage distress in 
Australia more generally. 
The research design involved a mixed method approach 
composed of two parts: first, a self administered survey; 
and, second, in-depth interviews. The survey sought general 
context information to generate a snapshot of the experience 
of mortgage distress. The in-depth interviews were designed 
to illuminate households’ circumstances leading into mortgage 
distress, the actual experiences of mortgage distress, and 
their coping strategies. In in-depth interviews also enabled 
borrowers to discuss alternatives for managing mortgage 
distress and the barriers they perceived as impeding access 
to these alternatives. The in-depth interviews also allowed the 
possibility of new perspectives not considered in the interview 
design especially by drawing on the direct experiences of the 
interviewees. 
Originally, several screening questions were devised to be used 
in the selection of the study’s participants. These screening 
questions had the intention of limiting participants sample 
to those who had been three months or more in arrears on 
mortgage repayments. However, we very soon realised that 
many individuals considered themselves to be in mortgage 
distress, even though they had remained current with their 
monthly repayments. We decided therefore to broaden our 
sampling frame to include not only those who had recently 
been in arrears, but also those who were struggling to meet 
their mortgage debt obligations. 
DATA GATHERING TOOLS
Self Administered Survey 
The self administered survey consisted of a questionnaire 
divided into four parts. The first part sought to gather general 
information about the borrower’s level of mortgage distress, 
the characteristics of the mortgaged property, such as its value 
and location, and the name and type of the mortgage lender. 
The second part of this survey attempted to get information 
about the borrower in terms of educational level, competence 
in English and employment status. The third part included 
questions about the mortgage transaction itself, focusing on 
the mortgage search process, the information flow between 
borrower and lender, and the nature of their relationship during 
the transaction. The fourth and last part of the survey explored 
the circumstances under surrounding the mortgage distress 
and attempted to identify the coping strategies of borrowers 
when dealing with mortgage distress.
The survey was available to participants in two ways: online 
and by paper copy. The survey was available online through 
a dedicated page on the Urban Research Centre’s web 
site. Paper copies of the survey were supplied with self 
addressed prepaid envelopes. Even though self-administered 
questionnaires can raise the chance of misunderstanding, it 
was felt their use would diminish the influence of the potentially 
high level of embarrassment associated with mortgage distress 
by enabling a participant to fill out a questionnaire discreetly 
without having to talk to a researcher.
The self administered survey was completely anonymous. 
At the end of the survey there was an invitation for people 
to participate in a one-hour face-to-face in-depth interview. 
Potential participants were informed that interviews could be 
held at a place and time convenient to them, and that a grocery 
voucher to the value of $50 would be given to interviewees as 
compensation for their time. Those willing to be interviewed 
could provide their contact details in strict confidence. 
In a period of four months, though, we gathered just 42 
completed online surveys, out of which 33 could be used for 
analysis, while the remaining 9 had to be disregarded due to 
insufficient data. This small response was despite a major, 
targeted paid-advertisement and media publicity campaign to 
promote response to the survey. Reasons for the low response 
rate are discussed below.
In-depth Interviews
The in-depth interviews had the purpose of expanding on 
the topics covered in the self administered survey. They were 
semi-structured interviews organised around the project aims 
and research questions focussing on the household context, 
the mortgage transaction and the mortgage experience. An 
interview guide was developed following an extensive review 
of the issues identified in the literature as having an impact on 
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mortgage distress. However, interviews were not limited to pre-
identified matters and a number of new themes emerged from 
participants’ personal accounts and experiences. 
The interview participants were a subgroup of those who 
responded to the survey. All survey participants who provided 
their contact details by the end of August 2009 were contacted 
by the researchers. Up to three attempts were made to contact 
those who had showed interest in being interviewed. The 
scheduling of interviews took from two to four communications 
between the interviewee and the researchers. Three potential 
interviewees could not be reached and did not return calls 
and/or emails, while two decided not to participate after initial 
contact. 
There were 16 interviews conducted between the months of 
May and August 2009. One interview involved a household 
couple while the rest of the interviews were with individuals. 
The interviews were conducted either at the Urban Research 
Centre’s offices, or in accessible places such as cafes chosen 
by interviewees. The length of the interviews ranged from 45 to 
90 minutes. Following approval from interviewees, interviews 
were recorded and transcribed. One interview was conducted 
in Spanish and this interview was translated following 
transcription. 
RECRUITMENT PROCESS
When considering different sampling possibilities for this 
research project, it was acknowledged that, although desirable 
from a statistical practices viewpoint, a random sample 
approach would was not a feasible field option. Even if it had 
been possible to build a list of potential participants from which 
to select candidates randomly, this approach would have not 
been cost-effective. Therefore it was decided that a snowballing 
technique was a second best choice. 
The research project presented a challenge in terms of 
recruitment of participants for several reasons. First, the issue 
of mortgage distress is a highly sensitive personal experience 
with affected borrowers reluctant to talk about it. Second, 
borrowers experiencing mortgage distress exhibit diverse 
demographic, socio-economic and cultural backgrounds 
making the design of a sampling frame very difficult, especially 
given the difficulty in recruiting to such a frame from a 
potentially small volunteer population. Third, confidentiality, 
anonymity and privacy issues were important ethical 
considerations that constrained researchers in contacting 
potential participants directly as a result of identification 
from the records of a third-party agency such as a financial 
institution, agent or an assistance organisation. 
The recruitment process evolved in stages, based on a trial-
and-error approach. In a first attempt to recruit participants, 
paid newspaper advertisements ran for two weeks in April 
2009 and two weeks in May 2009 in free circulation suburban 
newspapers and ethnic community newspapers in the three 
most common ethnic languages in the targeted area (Turkish, 
Arabic and Chinese). These newspapers were circulated 
weekly. The advertising material was published four times in a 
period of eight weeks. On the first occasion, the advertisement 
was accompanied by a feature article on mortgage distress, 
designed to raise awareness about the issue and provide 
background information about the project, and so entice 
participation. An invitation to participate was printed below 
the feature article. The very limited response arising from the 
newspaper advertising campaign forced the development of a 
revised recruitment strategy. 
With the help of advisory discussions with a number of 
community workers in the region, we realised that we had 
underestimated the difficulty of recruiting people to talk about 
the sensitive topic of mortgage distress. We became aware 
of the need to build a relationship based on a high level of 
trust with potential participants in order to increase their 
willingness to contribute their stories to the project. Hence, 
our revised recruitment strategy involved seeking the support 
and assistance of local community organisations which had 
involvement with advising or counselling people experiencing 
mortgage distress in the targeted districts. Our focus was 
on generalist organisations or networks of organisations and 
those with a large migrant and multicultural clientele. We initially 
contacted twenty organisations that seemed to have a client 
base that potentially matched the characteristics of those we 
sought to interview. Help was sought in a number of ways 
including by the display of posters carrying project information 
and the distribution of paper copies of the survey to clients in a 
discreet manner such as during a time spent in a waiting room. 
The managers or equivalent of chosen organisations were 
contacted by email and subsequently sent, or had delivered 
in person, a mortgage pack consisting of laminated display 
posters and ten to twenty paper copies of the survey with pre-
paid self-addressed envelopes. 
A further phase of the revised recruitment campaign took place 
during July 2009. This second phase focused on contacting 
financial counsellors in Western Sydney. These personnel were 
typically from the Salvation Army, Wesley Mission, and other 
not-for-profit organisations. Twenty financial counsellors were 
visited in person or sent a mortgage pack.
Even after all recruitment initiatives, we were still able to 
interview only nine females and eight males. Five of these 
participants learned about the project through an advertisement 
and/or the news commentary in a Fairfax community 
newspaper. Ten of contacted us after receiving information 
about the project from a staffer at a community organisation 
or from a financial counsellor. One participant found out about 
the project through a web contact and another from a work 
colleague. The diversity of the sample of interviewees can be 
appreciated in more detail from the interview vignettes placed 
throughout this report.
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The main purpose of this project is to understand the 
experience of mortgage distress from a borrower’s perspective. 
The Western Sydney area has been identified consistently in 
recent years as containing suburbs with Australia’s highest 
rates of mortgage arrears; hence this metropolitan region was 
our geographical focus. Between the months of May and 
August 2009 we surveyed 33 individuals in mortgage distress 
and held in-depth interviews with 17 of these. In this chapter 
we present the findings from this data collection survey. Two 
important preliminary findings concerning the definition of 
mortgage stress which emerged at the recruitment stage of the 
project are: 
•  Mortgage distress and financial stress more broadly are 
perceived as the same problem; people who experience 
either or both do not think of them as separate issues.
•  There is a risk of underestimating mortgage distress by 
focusing on arrears instead of accepting a wider more 
contextualised definition of the problem. 
These preliminary findings have shaped the way in which this 
study was designed and conducted. We have attempted to 
investigate mortgage distress as an issue often associated 
with other types of financial stress. In addition, we explored 
the meanings that research participants attached to mortgage 
distress. Our findings support recent reports calling for a more 
comprehensive definition of mortgage distress (Yates & Milligan 
2007; Berry, Dalton et al. 2009). 
THE DEFINITION OF MORTGAGE 
DISTRESS
As noted in chapter 6, our initial intention was to recruit people 
who were 90 days or more in arrears in mortgage repayments. 
We soon realised, however, that most of those who volunteered 
to be part of the study had never, or very rarely, missed a 
mortgage repayment. In spite of this, they defined themselves  
as being in mortgage distress. They revealed that they were 
finding it difficult to make their mortgage repayments, and they 
were putting a lot of effort and creativity into not falling behind. 
Such accounts highlight many of the shortcomings of 
conventional definitions of mortgage distress and the 
measurement of mortgage distress in terms of arrears and 
defaults rates as discussed in chapter 4. Moreover, these 
accounts further confirm the difficulty of thinking about 
mortgage distress and financial stress as separate issues, 
when they are in reality highly interconnected.
At the time of interview, most people in our sample could be 
classed as desirable clients in their lenders’ books, given that 
they had never missed a monthly instalment. Figure 7.1 shows 
that at the time of the survey, 27 out of 33 survey respondents 
were not in arrears in the previous three months. However, the 
figure also shows that 25 respondents had found it difficult to 
make monthly repayments at some stage during the previous 
6 months.
These responses suggest a problem which has the prospect 
of worsening should the efforts by borrowers to keep up to 
date with mortgage repayments become unsuccessful as a 
result of households experiencing further financial difficulties, 
or if the present levels of disciplined repayment behaviour 
cannot be sustained. Latent threats to systematic stability 
aside, the respondents’ stories of difficulties in managing 
mortgage debt tell of major impairments to the Australian 
social fabric and probably to selected suburban property 
markets. The social and community costs of mortgage 
distress are significant and widespread. These costs include 
the costs of economic, social, health and emotional impacts at 
Figure 7.1 Arrears compared to difficulty to make repayments
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Figure 7.3 Survey respondents by level of education
individual household scales. They also include the economic, 
social, health and emotional costs that are borne at broader 
community levels, an issue brought to the attention of the 
researchers in discussions with community services and 
non-profit organisations (see also The Wesley Mission 2009). 
These organisations (see appendix 4) reported a heightened 
demand for their services from those experiencing mortgage 
and financial stress pressures. This demand has been difficult 
to satisfy due to its unusual nature and extent.
 
As noted, to overcome the limitations of technical definitions 
of mortgage stress and their concentration on measuring 
rates of arrears and defaults, our recruitment strategy not 
only included people in arrears but also those self-defined 
as being in mortgage distress. The aim was to capture the 
issue of mortgage distress in a more comprehensive way and 
one that corresponded more closely to householders’ actual 
life experiences. Our approach, then, was to see mortgage 
distress as a circumstance in a household that could be 
positioned within a continuum ranging from “facing difficulties 
to make monthly repayments” to “facing repossession or 
selling the property.” 
Figure 7.2  Understanding mortgage distress as a continuum
THE POPULATION AFFECTED BY 
MORTGAGE DISTRESS
A second survey finding is that respondents in mortgage distress 
are very diverse in term of socio-demographic characteristics. 
Respondents reported very different levels of educational 
attainment; they vary widely in terms of English language 
competence; and the value of their mortgage commitments 
varies significantly, from under $100,000 to nearly $700,000 
(figure 7.5). The diversity of the subjects who answered the 
survey is illustrated in figures 7.3 and 7.4. Yet despite these 
variances, the survey data shows that a reasonable level of 
competence could be assumed for most who entered mortgage 
contracts. Around 70% of respondents claimed to have 
completed secondary studies, while almost 70% of respondents 
claimed to be native English speakers with the great majority 
believing their competence in English to be good. 
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Figure 7.4 Survey respondents competence in English
Figure 7.5 Value of mortgages as reported by survey respondents 
Note: Of 33 survey respondents, 6 had mortgage debt of less than $200,000 and 5 had a debt of $400,000 or more. The mortgage debt of the 
remaining 22 respondents lay between these values.
The heterogeneity of survey participants is also reflected in 
in-depth interview data. That said, most of the individuals 
participating in the in-depth interviews belong to one of two 
categories: 
• People who have never missed a mortgage repayment, and 
• People who have already lost or sold their properties. 
Obviously, there is a substantial unravelling of mortgage distress 
between these two sets of circumstances. There are also other 
outcomes, including pathways where households achieve 
a successful housing and mortgage outcome. In the highly 
stressful period where a mortgage might be unravelling, though, 
we now recognise the very real impediments to participation in 
a mortgage distress study. As one respondent reflected:
  I wouldn’t have been able to come to this interview if 
I was in the middle of that tunnel. There was no way. 
And I would have been crying the whole time… 
     [CHARLENE]
The respondent interview data are presented in two ways 
in this report. Chapter 8, which follows, presents vignettes 
that illustrate the stories of many of the participants. These 
vignettes are grouped in four themes identified consistently 
in the literature and through our observations as common 
triggers of mortgage distress. It is important to note, however, 
that mortgage distress is a complex mix of cause and effect 
circumstances. This complexity is confronted in chapter 9 
which presents a systematic analysis of the themes and issues 
underpinning mortgage distress more generally.
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The vignettes in this chapter capture some of the participants’ 
experiences of mortgage distress. Whereas Chapter 9 presents 
an analytical breakdown of the interview data in order to better 
understand the processes that lead to mortgage distress, 
this chapter presents some of the individual stories. Their 
presentation shows that it is very difficult to establish direct 
cause-effect connections in accounting for mortgage distress. 
Instead, the stories show the complex variables and uncertainties 
that in combination lead to people into mortgage distress.
As noted in chapters 6 and 7, the process of recruiting 
volunteers for this study, establishing contact and rapport, 
and then conducting the interviews, proved to be challenging 
especially given the sensitivity of the mortgage distress topic. 
The wording of the vignettes is kept as close as possible to the 
language used by the research participants with adjustments 
to preserve confidentiality. The names of the participants have 
been changed, any information that could be related to their 
name, address or lender has also been modified. Fortunately, 
and perhaps as a direct result of the painstaking recruiting 
efforts of the project’s field investigators, the transcript of each 
interview shows the particular richness of each individual story. 
And because the stories are drawn directly from respondents’ 
experience of mortgage distress, their language is laden with 
stress and other emotions. 
The vignettes are grouped under headings that denote  
the reason for the onset on mortgage distress. However,  
aside from the convenience of sorting the vignettes into 
categories based on various reasons for mortgage distress,  
it should be noted that in each case the nominated reason was 
only one of the myriad of issues that contributed to falling into 
mortgage distress.
Morna is in her early fifties and is a higher education 
employee with two postgraduate degrees. In 1998 
her “husband left her for another woman, leaving 
her alone to raise three children” aged ten, five, and 
three months old. She originally had a joint mortgage 
with her then husband, which she refinanced on 
several occasions. Although her gross annual income 
is above $70,000, and her mortgage is not too big 
(around $260,000), she has been struggling financially 
for the last eleven years. She spends 75% of her 
salary on her mortgage monthly repayments (interest 
only), a car loan, credit card debt, and insurance. She 
has been unable to make her mortgage repayment 
only once, because she needed the money “to 
celebrate her oldest son’s 21st birthday.” But even 
though, in the bank’s records she appears as a near 
perfect client, she juggles every month to make ends 
meet. “When her husband left her, she thought that 
the emotional part of it would be the worst.” She 
never imagined that eleven years later she would 
still be struggling financially because of it. And the 
stress is affecting her health: she finds it difficult to 
sleep at night, and she drinks more than she would 
like to. If she had known how hard it was to support 
three children on her own, she says she would have 
thought more carefully before getting a divorce. She 
is currently locked into a three year fixed interest loan 
with an 8.7% interest rate. She regrets having decided 
to fix the rate in 2008, only a month before interest 
rates started falling. But, at the time, she was afraid 
that if the rate would continue to rise, she would 
have to default on her mortgage. For her, keeping the 
house is priority number one; “this is what her kids will 
get if something happens to her.”
RELATIONSHIP BREAKDOWN
The two vignettes in this section show the personal 
circumstances of two women in different life stages. The first 
vignette shows the case of a divorced working mother of three. 
Even though Morna has a professional occupation background 
and stable employment, heading up a single income household 
and paying high interest rates on her mortgage is extremely 
challenging. The second vignette shows the case of a young 
female whose aspiration to own her home changed significantly 
after the experience of mortgage distress. Gabrielle nominates 
drastic changes in lifestyle and the breakup of her relationship 
as negative outcomes of that experience.
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Gabrielle is a thirty year old single woman, working 
in the not-for-profit sector. In 2005 Gabrielle and 
her then partner of four years decided that “it was 
time to take the next step and buy a house. At the 
time they felt it was the natural thing to do.” They 
searched for a house and a mortgage for more than 
a year, until they finally found a bank that offered 
them some small advantages compared to the 
other banks, and a house that they could get for 
$50,000 less than the advertised price. The bank 
was willing to give them a $380,000 loan, and 
even encouraged them to get a $500,000 loan 
(which they refused because they were unsure 
of their ability to repay it). Gabrielle was surprised 
and flattered to be treated as such a “safe” client, 
in particular when she had only graduated from 
university a few months before, and had only been 
at her job (her first job as a graduate) for three 
months. They were paying just over 5% interest rate 
for the first year. And even though between 40% 
and 50% of her salary was going to the mortgage 
repayments, they were doing fine. Her partner had a 
well paid but at times unsteady job as a contractor 
but he was also contributing significantly to their 
expenses. In 2006, as interest rates continued 
to increase, they started struggling to make the 
monthly repayments. They were never more than 
two weeks late, but in order not to fall behind, 
they started spending more on the mortgage-
linked credit card, being more careful with their 
grocery shopping, and finding additional sources 
of income (such as babysitting). The stress arising 
from difficulties paying the mortgage “was partially 
what brought Gabrielle’s relationship to an end after 
seven years together.” They are currently trying to 
sell the house. She wishes she had been able to 
see in 2005 what she clearly understands now “that 
being a homeowner is not the only way in which to 
move forward in life”; and that to compromise her 
lifestyle and future dreams to service a mortgage is 
not what she considers a “fulfilling life.”
LOW-INCOME EARNERS
These two vignettes show particular cases in which the 
borrowers are in very low income brackets, and supported 
financially in part by welfare payments. Yet both Hugo and 
Martha found financial institutions willing to provide home 
loans approved. Both households now face great difficulties in 
meeting mortgage repayments especially as debt levels rise.
Hugo migrated to Sydney in 2003. Although in 
Australia he does not “need to worry about the 
ethnic violence of his home country”, his life here 
has not been as he had expected. With a family 
comprised of fourteen members (including his own 
children, a nephew, and a grandchild), it was almost 
impossible for Hugo to find a place to rent. Most 
landlords were not willing to let a three-bedroom 
unit to a large family such as his. He finally found 
a place to stay, but a year later he “was given an 
ultimatum”; he had to vacate the house in a month. 
Following a friend’s advice, he researched the 
possibility of getting a mortgage. With his low and 
unstable income it was not easy to find a lender, 
but finally he was able to buy an old four-bedroom 
house in a suburb with little facilities and services. 
He felt confident about his ability to make the 
$600 a week repayments, because he had been 
promised a permanent full time job at the company 
he was working for, and because he believed that 
his daughter (a nurse in her twenties) could help 
him with repayments. However, he was never given 
the permanent position, and his daughter stopped 
helping him financially as soon as she got married 
and started saving for her own mortgage. Hugo has 
managed not to miss a payment so far, but with his 
$900 per fortnight salary and the additional $500 
he gets from Centrelink, he only has $200 left per 
fortnight to pay all the other bills and get food for 
his large family. He can only make his mortgage 
repayments by accumulating other unpaid bills and 
by having his family on a low-cost diet: dominated 
by semolina and rice. He is hoping to get a better-
paid job soon, but he is not too optimistic. He is 
“very disappointed with his life” and he is anxious 
about the future and how to keep providing shelter 
for his family.
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Martha is in her late forties. She has two teenage children and another son in his twenties; she has been divorced for 
a few years. In 2004 she was living with her three sons in a semi rural rented property about 5 kilometres away from 
the next suburban centre. The rent was not expensive, but she was spending a lot on petrol. She decided to use the 
$80,000 that she had saved from the sale of the family home after the divorce as a down payment to buy a house. 
She talked to two different mortgage brokers, and both of them told her that her options in terms of lenders were 
very limited, given that most lenders would not take into account child support as a source of income. Given these 
limitations, she opted for the broker that got her the lowest interest rate loan available to her. She is currently on a 7.4% 
fixed rate loan and 100% of her income as a child care worker goes to her mortgage monthly repayments. She has 
never been in arrears, but only because she heavily depends on a credit card on which she currently has a $15,000 
debt. In addition, she has had to cut down on basic needs such as clothes and food. Her adult son sometimes brings 
some food to the house but this is not a regular arrangement. A few months ago she “was in panic about her credit card 
debt, but when she phoned the bank, she was told that most people have more than one card and a larger debt than 
hers, hence, this had made her feel more relaxed.” When one of her sons turns 16 next year, the parenting payments for 
him will end, and without that additional source of income, Martha is afraid that she will struggle to make her mortgage 
payments. She will try to work longer hours, but as a child care worker she does not know how many more hours she 
can get, and whether her already “mature body will allow her to work longer days.”
LOSS OF INCOME
The next three vignettes show people affected by 
unforeseeable circumstances that have limited their ability  
to work and therefore their capacity to maintain the level  
of income necessary to make the required mortgage 
repayments. All involve illness as a prime cause of work 
interruption. In the first vignette the main income earner in the 
household, George, became sick and could not continue with 
his job. Because his employment contract was not stable, 
George lost his income which compromised his ability to repay 
George was born in the United Kingdom 55 years ago, but he has lived in Sydney for most of his adult life. He is 
married and has 7 adult children (only the youngest one living with him at the moment) and 11 grandchildren. For 
many years he lived in an inner west suburb of Sydney. His wife had grown up in this area too, and hence they had 
many friends and an active social life there. In February 2006 George and his wife decided that it was time to sell 
the house, pay off the debt and get a new, smaller mortgage. George is a first aid and health and safety instructor, 
in the vocational education sector. This type of job is seasonal which means that he enjoys times receiving large 
incomes but times of no income at all. On top of that this type of job does not have any leave entitlements. This being 
the case, he had to get a mortgage broker to find him a lender who was willing to give him a loan. The mortgage 
was small ($180,000) and he was able to get a flexible deal (he made extra payments when he could and made no 
payments when he couldn’t). Everything was going as planned until last year, when he had to spend some time in 
hospital due to a heart condition. At that time he got behind with payments and had to access superannuation to get 
back on track. A few months later he had an accident that left him in a wheel chair, with two broken arms and a brain 
injury. He has been out of work ever since and the bank has already sent him the sheriff with a repossession order 
apparently without any previous notice. George has currently asked the bank for a moratorium for five months, when 
he hopes to get back to work. But the bank employees have been extremely rude to him and not in the least helpful. 
He is optimistic about the future because he thinks there are many jobs available in his field; however, this has been a 
very bitter experience for him, not only because of the emotional stress that is attached to mortgage distress, but also 
because of the unnecessary bad treatment that he has received from most of the lender’s employees. Being a red 
cross and scouts’ volunteer, it is hard for George to understand why someone would treat a struggling human being 
with such malice, instead of genuinely trying to help.
the mortgage. In the second vignette, the loss of income  
was a factor in the mental illness of Charlene’s husband,  
which compounded income difficulties until it became 
impossible for the household to keep up with mortgage 
repayments. In the third case, a large portion of the income of 
the respondent, Michael, was dedicated to pay medical bills 
of his ill partner. This diversion of income created mortgage 
distress in the household as meeting repayments became 
increasingly difficult. 
32  |  Mortgage Distress Report
08    THE COMPLEX EXPERIENCE OF MORTGAGE DISTRESS
Charlene is a middle aged mother of four. She used to work at her husband’s very successful real estate business. A few 
years ago they decided to sell their home and move to a different suburb. However, the person who was supposed to buy 
their old house pulled out at the last minute, so Charlene and her family moved to the new house and rented the old one. 
For the first three years Charlene husband’s income was more than enough for them to make their monthly repayments on 
their two mortgages comfortably. The financial struggle began when Charlene’s husband started battling with depression 
as a result of stress caused by difficulties experienced in his business. He was unable to work for two years. The couple 
first sold their investment property, then they accessed superannuation and asked for a bank’s moratorium, but finally, 
in June 2008 their house was repossessed. They are now renting a smaller house in the same neighbourhood, and with 
Charlene’s husband back to work, she can finally see the light at the end of the tunnel. She hopes that one day they will be 
home owners again, but this time they will get a loan small enough that they can pay it back, even if they have no jobs, are 
on social security or Centrelink incomes.
Michael is in his mid forties. In the late 1980s he was living with his parents, when his father started experiencing some 
financial problems which resulted in them losing the family home. Michael decided that, after so many years of being 
helped and supported both financially and emotionally by his parents, it was time for him to take care of them. This is why 
he signed on a mortgage to build a new house on a small piece of land that his parents owned. He lived in this house 
with his parents until both of them passed away. It was only very recently that Michael started finding it hard to make his 
mortgage repayments. For the last few years, a large portion of his salary has been used to buy expensive medicine for his 
partner who has been diagnosed with cancer. To make matters worse, the small company for which he works was sold 
eighteen months ago, and the new owners cannot afford to pay him the overtime rates that he was used to before the 
change of management. Without this additional source of income, Michael cannot make his monthly repayments on the 
mortgage, and he is currently three months in arrears. He has been trying to look for a second job, but his search has so 
far been unsuccessful. He feels like the weight of the world is on his shoulders and he believes he has failed his parents 
and his partner. A lot of people have advised him to sell the house, but he cannot do that. The house, which Michael and 
his dad built with their own hands, is the last tie he has to his father and he would be devastated to let it go.
In the cases presented so far, the negative impacts of 
mortgage distress are associated with negative impacts on 
lifestyle, quality of life and mental health. The two vignettes in 
this last section show particular cases in which professional 
people have taken up mortgages with the idea that they would 
improve their lifestyles. The accounts of these participants 
Peter is in his early thirties. He recently immigrated to Australia, leaving his parents behind in his home country. He is a 
software contractor at a multinational company. His income is unsteady although whenever he does work he is paid well. 
Peter brought $10,000 with him when he first arrived to Sydney, and in a couple of years he has been able to save some 
more. He did not want to keep all his savings in a bank account; and in addition, he was paying a lot on rent. This is why he 
decided to get a mortgage for a dwelling of his own. He researched for three or four months and realized that he could not 
afford to get a large house or even an apartment in the inner city. He preferred to be cautious and get the smallest mortgage 
he could get, even if this meant buying a small unit in an unpopular suburb. He got a $235,000 mortgage with a major bank 
and has never missed a payment so far. However, he is worried about how he will manage to make his monthly repayments 
if he fails to get a renewed long term employment contract with the company for a long period of time. He is spending most 
of his salary on the mortgage and sending some money back home to support his parents. This means that he has to cut 
down on everything else, including some basic needs. He feels isolated and wonders if he will ever be able to establish a 
long term relationship, given that, due to his imposed frugality, his social life is limited to the few friends that every now and 
then visit him at his suburban unit. Even if he found a partner he worries that he would never able to afford to have children. 
He says if he had known the rules of the game before getting into the mortgage, or if he had been able to get some financial 
advice beforehand, he would have done things differently. At the time he signed the mortgage papers he asked many 
questions, but now, he thinks, he did not even know what the relevant questions to ask were. He is afraid to let the bank 
know that he is having a hard time making his monthly repayments. He fears that if he does, the bank might start pressuring 
him about his loan. But he knows that in the near future he might have to inform the bank.
reveal feelings of failure, insecurity and loneliness produced 
as a result of trying to cope with circumstances of mortgage 
distress. Despite the fact that these participants reported very 
strong feelings of disappointment they also reported that they 
have learnt a lot from the experience including an awareness of 
valuing what they see as the most important things in their lives.
EFFECTS OF MORTGAGE DISTRESS ON QUALITY OF LIFE
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Kamesh is an academic born overseas, in the early 
60s. He moved to Australia twenty years ago, after 
getting a degree from an Ivy League university and 
working for a company in North America for a few 
years. He got married in Sydney and currently has 
two teenage children, and a very large mortgage 
that he has struggled to repay as interest rates rose 
in the last two years. To avoid falling behind on his 
monthly repayments, Kamesh and his family have cut 
down on expenses such as eating out or buying new 
clothes. They have also relied heavily on seven credit 
cards, amassing a $20,000 debt at one point which 
he has profoundly regretted in retrospect. Kamesh 
grew up in poverty and remembers his parents valued 
education and health over all things; the limitations he 
experienced as a child have shaped Kamesh’s own 
view of what is important in life. He would not hesitate 
about selling the house if this was necessary so that 
his kids could get a university degree, and he would 
never cut down on expenses that might compromise 
his children’s nutrition and health. However, cutting 
down on what he considers luxury spending such 
as clothes, mobile phones, or television, is, in his 
view, not only a good way to avoid defaulting on his 
mortgage but also a valuable lesson for his children; 
according to Kamesh, in Australia people spend on 
unnecessary things; while a frugal life can be more 
fulfilling than a life focusing on consumerism. Kamesh 
knows that interest rates might go up again; hence 
he is now saving money just in case. He argues that 
getting such a large mortgage was a mistake, and 
one that caused such a strong emotional stress 
that at one point he was having suicidal thoughts. 
He does not want to go through that again and, 
hence, he will continue to buy second-hand clothes, 
he will keep the ban on soft drinks and popular 
brand products at home, and even now that he has 
managed to weather the storm.
Chapter 9 now presents the analysis of the findings that 
emerge from the 15 in-depth interviews. The interviews were 
structured to gather information on five topics, which can also 
be thought of as five stylised chronological steps down the 
mortgage distress path.
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Our study’s entrance point was the pursuit of reasons 
behind the decision to buy a house leading to the mortgage 
application and signing process. Second, we investigated the 
mortgage transaction process in order to understand how a 
lender (or its agent) and a mortgage product were selected; 
the level of knowledge and understanding present at the time 
of signing the mortgage; and the power relationship between 
lender and borrower, including the potential existence of 
predatory practices. Third, we sought to understand the 
process of entering mortgage distress and the reasons behind 
the passage into distress. Fourth, we were interested in 
understanding the coping strategies that people put in place 
to avoid and or deal with mortgage distress. Fifth, and finally, 
we asked about the impact that mortgage distress has on 
people’s lives. 
The five steps in which we divided the mortgage distress 
experience, then, are: 
i. the decision to buy a house, 
ii. the transaction, 
iii. the reasons behind mortgage distress, 
iv. the coping strategies, and 
v. the impacts of mortgage distress.
The interviews also included questions designed to explore two 
additional issues: 
vi. expectations for the future, and 
vii. regrets, and advice for others. 
The discussion which follows is organised according to 
this breakdown. Excerpts from the interviews are used for 
clarification and to support the findings. As in chapter 8, 
personal information that might identify interviewees has been 
altered or omitted for confidentiality reasons,
I. DECIDING TO GET A MORTGAGE
An opening question in the in-depth interviews was: “Why did 
you decide to buy a house?” Answers to the question point to 
three main reasons for buying a house:
• cultural reasons,
• economic reasons, and 
• a lack of alternatives. 
Cultural Reasons
As discussed in chapter 5, there has been a strong cultural 
tradition of home-ownership in Australia for over a century. One 
of the milestones of migrants and locals alike was to own their 
home. The cultural ideal of home ownership has thus become 
an important part of the housing careers of Australians.
The traditional tenure pathway of Australians involves leaving 
the parental home in a person’s early 20s, before securing a 
mortgage to buy a home to support family life in the late 20s or 
early 30s. This traditional pathway has been changing in recent 
decades due to a number of factors, including labour market 
instability, housing affordability pressures and a generational 
change in expectations and lifestyles (Flatau, Hendershott et al. 
2004). Despite these factors, the end goal – home-ownership – 
remains cemented in the mindset of most Australians; and, as 
we discuss in more detail below, Australians go to great lengths 
to achieve this goal.
Our interviews confirm the commitment of householders to 
home-ownership as an inevitable life-cycle stage. Several 
interviewees described buying a house as a natural path, as if 
life was designed in steps, and buying a house was a key step 
in moving forward:
 
  “No, no, because we were always taught that never rent, 
buy yourself a house, have your own home.” 
     [STELLA]
  “I suppose it was just something that you do, you know, 
you get to a point, you’re in a relationship you’re moving 
forward, you buy a house to settle down for the future. It’s 
been…it’s always been something that I wanted to do.” 
     [GABRIELLE]
Economic Reasons
Most interviewees referred at least one economic reason for 
buying a house. Households typically view buying a house as a 
smarter financial option than renting. Our respondents confirm 
that house purchases are pursued not just with the aim of 
securing a housing service, but as a deliberate and major part 
of long-term financial planning. This is consistent with Susan 
Smith’s claim for the emergence of a “new financial order of 
housing” (Smith 2008, p521) where owner-occupied homes 
are recast as vehicles for wealth creation and accumulation. 
When the financial dimensions of housing become prioritised, 
home purchasers bring a specific set of expectations to the 
mortgage transaction, viewing the home as a financial asset 
requiring ongoing maintenance and improvement alongside 
deft and strategic participation in marketplace activity. Such 
skill and diligence is assumed to ensure rising asset value 
thereby providing economic security during life’s key steps: 
early working life, child rearing, the empty-nester years, 
retirement, and the aged-care twilight years.
Hence we now have a complex view of what a dwelling is, 
with raised expectations in particular about the financial 
performance of housing, expectations which may prove to 
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be unrealistic in many circumstances. The contradiction, as 
we point out in chapter 3, is that a competent framing of the 
dwelling as a financial instrument should involve an ongoing 
assessment of its performance within a financial risk versus 
financial reward calculation. Yet, more commonly, borrowers 
see increased household leverage as a good idea based on 
the strong belief that real house values inevitably appreciate 
at high-end rates. Our interviews revealed that home buyers 
commonly lack the skills to properly assess the risks involved 
as a long-term mortgagor: 
  “To increase my asset because that…yeah, because the 
rent is just wasting money, that’s what I thought. To buy 
a house if I pay certain amount, the house will be mine.” 
     [STELLA]
The attractiveness of the home as a secure financial 
investment is also encouraged by the discourse of individual 
autonomy rather than collective responsibility in the pursuit 
of positive life outcomes. As argued in chapter 3, there is 
growing pressure in Australia for self-management of risk 
and for taking private responsibility for personal development 
and attainment. This corresponds to diminishing enthusiasm 
among governments for comprehensive social safety nets 
and for the provision of universally available public goods 
and services. This elevation of private responsibility includes 
growing responsibility for retirement income and support. From 
this perspective, the home has become a central instrument 
in achieving household autonomy including for so-called 
“independence” for household members in the future including 
in their retirement years.
  “…like rents are about $400 or $380 so, you know, 
I’m not paying that much more than a rent and I’m still 
hoping that sort of you know my house is an asset to me 
if…for the future because like when we split up, I didn’t 
have any …I hadn’t been working much so, I didn’t 
have any super. So that’s sort of…my house is my super 
really.” 
     [MARTHA]
  “…we were blind, deaf, and dumb, because we were 
caught first by the investment…one always thinking 
about the future…thinking we came here as adults, 
thinking we don’t have enough superannuation…
specially thinking of our daughters…I was always 
thinking about the future and when they [BROKER/
LENDER] said, ‘If you renovate the house you will have 
more opportunities, more money for tomorrow.’ “ 
     [MERCEDES]
The period of the housing boom in Australia arising from 
around the mid-1990s coincided with a large increase in the 
number of households purchasing residential dwellings as 
discrete investments. Again, what is observable here is the way 
in which housing has become defined as an entrepreneurial 
activity available to everyday borrowers. Owner-occupiers are 
encouraged to mobilise their housing equity as an investment 
stake, with housing, again, as the vehicle, a tax favoured 
investment in an appreciating market. 
  “I was working there full time every week. My husband 
got a good job so because we were in a good 
situation, this accountant told us ‘Why don’t you buy an 
investment?’ My husband was afraid, I mean, he didn’t 
want to do that but thinking of the girls’ future…well, we 
got into the investment in 2003.” 
     [MERCEDES]
  “…you can’t keep your money as a cash reserve in…like 
if you want to keep it as money in the bank you will get 
taxed on whatever interest you get…so I had $10,000 
worth in cash…so I decided to invest in some…some 
kind of real estate or property…” 
     [PETER]
Another economic rationale reported by interviewees was the 
desire by parents to leave a fully owned residential property to 
their children as their legacy, so that their children would have 
their own launch pad into the housing market and a safety net 
for their future. People who were parents or wanted to become 
parents saw paying the mortgage and keeping the property as 
the main way not just to secure their children’s current housing 
stability but also to secure their children’s future especially 
in case of unforeseen circumstances. Some respondents 
mentioned that their parents made efforts to secure a home for 
them when they were children and they wanted to do the same 
for their own children.
  “...[selling the house] that would be last resort…I just 
want to have something that’s a bit secure, and also 
it’s about having something if anything happens to me; 
it’s about having something for the boys, because their 
father is renting and he doesn’t have any money, and he 
doesn’t have life insurance or you know all of that sort of 
stuff, so there’s nothing.” 
     [MORNA]
Lack of alternatives
Some of the people interviewed decided to buy a house 
because they found it more convenient than renting; that 
is, home-ownership was preferred for practical rather than 
economic reasons. Renting was seen consistently as unable 
to provide security of tenure and very limiting in terms of being 
able to adapt a dwelling to suit personal and aesthetic needs. 
  “I just thought no, I just want somewhere that’s mine and 
I don’t have to worry about moving, because a couple of 
times we had to move because they were selling.” 
     [KATE AND JOSH]
  “…first the problem who pushed me to get the mortgage 
is the large family I have. Because when I came to 
Australia in 2003 I came…we were a family size of 14…it 
was very hard to find a landlord who could accept…to…
to rent us a house.”
      [HUGO]
This quotation presents an exceptional case that is linked 
directly to the household’s recent immigration. Limited 
accessibility to appropriate housing pushed this migrant family 
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to get into a mortgage that involved high risk. In the interview, 
the householder revealed that his family comprised 14 people, 
mostly dependent children of varying ages, and was reliant 
on a single income plus government transfer entitlements. 
The interviewee claimed he did not have an alternative to 
purchasing a house since the household was ineligible for 
public housing and because landlords did not want to rent to a 
family of such size. 
II. THE MORTGAGE TRANSACTION
One of the goals of this study is to understand the transaction 
process surrounding the acquisition of a mortgage. Our 
examination has involved three areas: 
•  research conducted by householders before deciding on a 
lender and the mortgage make-up, 
•  borrowers’ knowledge and understanding of the mortgage 
papers, 
•  the relationship between borrower and lender, including the 
existence of any predatory practices.
Deciding on a mortgage broker and lender
In investigating a borrower research activity and how a decision 
is taken on a lender and the mortgage make-up, we were 
concerned with these questions:
•  How much effort do people put into researching alternative 
lenders and mortgage options before signing mortgage 
papers?
• What influences a final decision? 
Most interviewees admit they did not put enough time or effort 
into researching mortgage options before making a decision. 
Another common behaviour was to delegate the decision about 
mortgage make-up to a mortgage broker especially by trusting 
a broker’s recommendation without any serious scrutiny. 
Several interviewees indicated that their broker offered them 
a couple of options with strong advice on which one was the 
best to choose. This advice was always taken.
In many cases we observed that the mortgage search was not 
so much about finding the best lender or best mortgage option 
but about finding a lender – whether mediated by a broker or 
not – that that would make mortgage finance available after 
other financial institutions had declined their applications. In 
general the interviewees in this situation were people with less 
stable incomes or had significantly low income levels, or both. 
Knowing that mainstream institutions were not willing to offer 
a loan, mortgage seekers often took the only option that they 
were given.
  “A friend, or an acquaintance basically gave us the 
number of a mortgage broker, and so we rang the 
person, the person came around and we talked about 
what we wanted to do...Yeah, basically he came up with 
two possibilities and he went through the pros and cons 
of each one with us, why this particular one we went for 
was better than the other one, and it was the best of what 
was available for our particular situation because we had 
periods of unemployment where we couldn’t pay at all, 
so we had to make lump sum payments here and there 
to sort of cover things and it should work out. So that’s 
what we went for….So it’s basically based on the easiest 
mortgage to get considering my working situation.” 
      [GEORGE]
  “We’ve got a loan with them before…and so we went 
through the mortgage broker to get the loan, like all 
set up and it was actually a low doc loan…I suppose 
because they were happy to loan us the money, we were 
happy to accept their offer.” 
            [CHARLENE]
  “…the only one that we could find that would deal with 
a mortgage on flood prone land which is where it is; it’s 
a one…one to 100 year flood prone land; and at that 
stage I was not working full time because the baby was 
only three to six months old and I was still finishing my 
masters’ degree. So at that stage I didn’t have a great 
income. It was through [BANK] which is a Queensland 
bank. So that’s what I…who I went with.” 
      [MORNA]
For those who did have borrowing options, common factors 
influencing a decision to choose a particular lender were:
•  a previous personal or family history of banking with a 
lender;
•  a brand name they knew and trusted;
•  the opportunity to speak with an actual person;
•  the offer of flexibility in terms of how and when repayments 
were to be made; and
•  the interest rate schedule compared to other lenders.
As the following extracts from interviews show, usually more 
than one of these factors coexisted in making an option the 
most attractive: 
“  My…my parents used to bank with [BANK], so I thought I’ll 
just do what my parents did, I’ll just…you know they’re our 
family bank, so yeah… 
  “We researched a little bit…we looked for about a year…
more than a year. …different banks and had a few 
interviews at different banks but we settled on [BANK]. 
Because I had banked with them for my personal banking 
and I was happy with their service and their conditions 
and they gave us, you know, a few…a few…you know 
extra, like a 0.5% discount on the interest rates… 
  …whether there was a bank nearby that you could 
actually go in and talk to somebody if something was 
going on. That was important to me, I didn’t want to have 
a faceless, you know, organisation. So…yeah, things like 
that and we… you know the flexibility with…we have…
like we have a withdrawal facility, so we had the option of 
you know putting in a lot of money into our mortgage and 
then taking it out if need be…” 
 [GABRIELLE]
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But even those interviewees, who seemed to have done 
some research before signing mortgage papers, admit that 
receiving information about different mortgage options, 
and really understanding the financial and legal jargon in 
that information, are two different things. The aspect of the 
diversity and complexity of mortgage products was mentioned 
by most interviewees regardless of their level of education, 
understanding of the English language, age or even time spent 
doing research on mortgages. The diversity and complexity 
of mortgage products made comparability a complicated 
exercise. As a result, interviewees claimed that they became 
trusting of the person or institution that seemed to provide the 
most complete information or that gave them personalised 
attention and customer service. 
Knowledge and understanding
This theme explored the question of how well borrowers 
understood the mortgage contract. Usually, interviewees who 
accessed their mortgage through a broker delegated the 
information gathering and interpreting to the broker:
 
  “I really relied on the broker I think because I hadn’t dealt 
with the big money before. You know I’d just dealt with 
the family budget and I didn’t really deal with the house 
stuff before…before I split up. So yeah it was a bit new, 
and daunting and scary.” 
[MARTHA]
Yet those who were more involved in the information gathering 
process typically believe they were not provided with enough 
quality information to make their selection wisely. However, this 
realisation came in retrospect with borrowers only discovering 
the limitations of their loans once they were facing disruptive 
circumstances. 
   “…he didn’t explain two things. The first thing was he 
sort of didn’t really talk about interest rates as such, but 
if he’d said to me, if you fix your rate and change…and 
you want to change back to variable , it’s going to cost 
you a lot of money, I would have probably said no. And 
he didn’t also tell me that when you’ve got a variable 
rate, you can fix it any time you want…” 
[MORNA]
  “As a first-time buyer, I didn’t know what the rules, 
what the responsibilities, and if something got delayed 
I would have been losing my 10% of money, and there 
is no guidance…you can check in online, there are 
some blogs say about how to deal with that, but it is not 
advice, it’s like what they experience…I didn’t have much 
experience on what kind of questions I need to ask them, 
and unless you know what to ask then, they don’t tell 
you, and that is the…where the difficult part is.” 
[PETER]
Others did not ask too many questions because they basically 
trusted whatever the lender or broker or developer (as in 
the case below) said. The following quotation relating to 
an investment borrower shows how some people failed to 
differentiate a sales pitch from sound financial estimation: 
  “They told me rent will be $650 a week and …rent was 
$340…it wasn’t really a water view, it was on the side 
and the air conditioning was blocking the water view. 
And the place was so small…
  I didn’t investigate that…because I believed the word 
they said.”
[LAURA]
Most interviewees blame themselves for not having done their 
homework thoroughly and for failing to read the detail in a 
mortgage contract. Some acknowledged that they let emotion 
overshadow reason when deciding to take on a mortgage:
  “We knew what we were getting into. Had we known 
what we know now though, we would have seriously 
read through the loan contract, all the small print in far 
greater detail. And we may not have entered into the 
loan contract had we known what the small print says in 
the loan contract… 
  …Oh I think emotions play a big role actually…because 
it’s all exciting and oh this is going to be wonderful 
having our own home, instead of really seriously 
considering the worst case scenario that could easily 
happen once interest rates start to rise again, all they 
can see is the now and the immediate. Oh, we can 
afford it, this is going to be great, it’s our own home, 
look what we’ve got.” 
[CHARLENE]
The difficulty to understand mortgage products is not the  
only challenge in the decision to take a mortgage. Strong 
desire and other emotions limit clear-headed and rational 
decision making. An understanding that recurs throughout  
the interviews is that the mortgage decision occurs in a 
context where all parties involved downplay the high risks 
involved. Yet while the majority of the survey participants 
acknowledge that they are in mortgage distress because 
they did not make the right decision and that they should 
have known better, they do not blame the broker or financial 
institution even if they express the view that they may had 
been misled by them.
The lender/broker and borrower  
relationship
In exploring the relationship between a borrower and a lender 
or broker, we found interviewees for the most part were 
satisfied with the performance of brokers or lenders during the 
transaction period:
  “Well, the broker was good. He was a nice guy. He 
worked it all out, gave us a bit of advice in nice simple 
terms. I thought the broker was very good. He rang up 
about two or three months after we got the house to 
make sure everything was okay…And the [NON-BANK 
LENDER] people we first took out the mortgage, not 
that we had much contact with them, but whenever we 
had any contact with them were nice and polite.” 
[GEORGE]
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However, in some of the interviews, mortgagors indicate that 
the relationship between borrower and lender can sometimes 
go from “grooming” to “bullying”. A recurring complaint 
against lenders related to the rude treatment given by them to 
customers after mortgages entered arrears:
  And they also invited me down to [HOTEL] and [it] was 
big party with champagne and everything and they tried 
to convince me that I can buy another property and 
another and they put [some figures] on paper to show 
me that I can…
  …I just say, you know what the situation is and I can’t 
repay. What he going to do? And he didn’t reply and 
I wrote another letter, another letter, another letter, he 
didn’t reply. And I rang and secretary, [NAME], she was 
so rude to me… 
[LAURA]
  And didn’t even get a phone call. We got the boom, 
legal action things…They were quite nasty and  
mean and horrible. The lady I spoke to was really 
obnoxious… 
[GEORGE]
  ...Like the further this dragged on, I think the nastier 
they became… Like they would say if we don’t have…
if we haven’t faxed them the doctor’s certificate by this 
afternoon, you know, they’ll be sending us a default 
notice tomorrow…
  They were highly aggressive and it really affected my 
husband with his condition, like he continued to go 
downhill into a blacker hole…the closer it got to the end, 
the more aggressive and the more violent they became 
with their nastiness and I mean everyone knew what was 
going to happen but there was no sympathy or…there 
was no…they were not flexible. 
[CHARLENE]
The interviews allowed us to identify three different attitudes 
that borrowers have towards their lenders:
•  not caring too much about building a relationship with the 
broker or lender,
•  making efforts towards building a relationship with the 
broker or lender, and
•  taking a confrontational attitude towards the broker or 
lender.
The prevalence of these different attitudes among respondents 
seem to depend on the way people react to a lack of customer 
service, bad treatment, rudeness or bullying, following the 
onset of mortgage distress. One of the most common 
attitudes was to seek information elsewhere to make up for the 
lack of customer service within the broking house or lending 
institution:
  “…the bank broker he…he’s not doing it like, he’s not 
working any more, doing that. So I had to go to sort 
of like…like if I wanted to get some idea about interest 
rates and fixed and variable at the moment, then I went 
through someone else.” 
[GEORGE]
  “They give me another mortgage broker who lives 
in Melbourne, I don’t know him and I’m not in 
communication…I don’t communicate with him. For me 
the relationship with the broker is not important because 
what is important is to pay…”
[KAMESH]
Other more specific responses referred to a borrower trying to 
play along with what they saw as antagonistic advice, or simply 
focus on being attentive and polite. Others responded with a 
defiant attitude to the bad customer service and rudeness they 
encountered:
  “I’ve been, you know, putting a little bit of money here 
and there for him as well to make everyone happy, and 
I ring them and I say, ‘Listen I just put $100 in your 
account,’ and they say, ‘Oh thank you.’ So they don’t get 
angry by sending me letters all the time you know; so I 
make sure that I ring them all the time.” 
[STELLA]
  “…and if you don’t react the way that they [the bank] 
want you to react, then they take control by becoming 
abusive and threatening, so that they can have control of 
the conversation. So my husband’s taught me now that 
when I hear from them this time around, I’ll be informing 
them that I’m going to be recording the conversation for 
quality and coaching purposes just to let them know that 
they’d better be careful of every word they say to me 
so that I can throwing the ball back at them rather than 
them, you know, throwing the ball at me.” 
[CHARLENE]
An important issue that arose in the interviews relates to 
the guardedness of participants to communicate “changed 
circumstances” to the lender even though many mortgage 
products have clauses requiring such notification. For example, 
one participant was afraid to tell her lender that she was facing 
difficulties making repayments because of a fear of retaliation 
or bad treatment. Another participant believed he was not 
obliged to disclose information about changed circumstances 
to the lender and that making the lender aware of a change in 
employment could prejudice the possibility of negotiating any 
future changes in their loan repayments schedule. In general so 
long as these participants felt they could manage to make loan 
repayments on time they were unlikely to tell the lenders that 
they were having difficulties.
  “Because we were concerned that because we were 
high risk when they took us on, we thought if too soon 
into it we go in and say look, oops, you know, we need 
to drop payments or whatever, they’re less likely …and 
certainly they haven’t said anything, it’s just how we feel, 
they’d be less likely to be flexible with us… 
  …I mean we’re not legally obliged to tell them that we’re 
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out of work at the moment because we’re making the 
payments, so it’s not a problem. And we weren’t legally 
obliged to tell them that Josh was temping because it 
didn’t affect anything…” 
[KATE AND JOSH]
An unexpected finding of our study is that most interviewees 
do not think that their lenders have behaved in a deceiving or 
unscrupulous way. Instead, as noted above, the complaints of 
our respondents about lenders or brokers tend to be related to 
the way lenders or brokers have treated them, or they relate to 
the financial system in general.
That said, while our interviewees do not accuse lenders 
of being unfair, we have identified some practices from 
interviewees’ accounts in our view are questionable. These 
include:
• accepting child support as an income source;
  “There were only a couple of lenders that would take into 
account child support…” 
[MARTHA]
•  installing a credit card as a compulsory part of the 
‘mortgage product’;
  “…we got a credit card with our mortgage as well…
and now I understand why they do that. At the time, you 
know, it wasn’t something we asked for but it was part of 
the package and yeah, we relied on that heavily.” 
[GABRIELLE]
•  offering a higher credit limit to borrowers already in credit 
card debt;
  “…it’s the credit card that’s been my problem because 
I get towards the limit and then they offer me another 
$1,000 and then I take it because I panic if something 
happens, how will I pay for it [the mortgage]?” 
[KAMESH]
•  not disclosing the full range of ameliorative options to clients 
who suffer mortgage stress;
  “…They really should tell you upfront when you ring 
up and say okay, what can I do about this. I’m having 
problems; they should give you everything; send out to 
you all the options you have. Some of the things you find 
out by accident.” 
[GEORGE]
  “No, and I don’t really think…I don’t think we’ve ever been 
told that [about hardship assistance] in all the times gone 
before that we’ve had a mortgage, or went to apply for 
a new mortgage. And even when we did come into hard 
times, I don’t know if I’m jumping the gun too early but the 
lender, our lender did not offer any information whatsoever. 
Like, we had to find it all out for ourselves. Yeah.” 
[CHARLENE]
•  not informing borrowers of mergers or acquisitions affecting 
financial institutions that are holding borrowers’ mortgages;
  “…until we got the letter saying they had taken over from 
[LENDER], you know, still advertising as [DIFFERENT 
LENDER]; oh I didn’t know they existed. I had never 
heard of them.” 
[GEORGE]
  “Whenever I’ve gone back to…to fix it like it’s actually 
changed companies…the mortgage company has been 
bought out by someone which I wasn’t notified at the 
time.” 
[MARTHA]
• providing misleading information to customers;
  “So it’s [the credit card debt] got up to $15,000 now that 
I owe and I only…and I rang the bank up only this week 
because I was worried and the lady there seemed to 
think that that was perfectly normal. She says…she said, 
‘No.’…cause I was thinking I’m really strange owing that 
much. She says ‘No, you’re not,’ she said. ‘Yeah,’ she 
said, ‘Most people.’ And she said, ‘You’ve only got one 
card. Most people have three or four owing that much.’ 
So that made me feel better.” 
[MARTHA]
  “…they kept pointing out, like oh you guys are fine, 
we loan to people…we loan 100% to people who 
have debts and blah, blah, blah. So you’re in a perfect 
position, you can, you can…you know we were offered…
to borrow more money. We …we could have borrowed 
more…more money in terms of what the bank said. But 
for what we knew we could afford for our standard of 
living, we…we…we knew the maximum that we wanted 
to borrow…” 
[GABRIELLE]
Yet these practices that we see as questionable were not 
usually defined as such by the interviewees. In a similar vein, 
our responses show that when participants were asked to 
agree or disagree with the following statements: 
•  “The lender arranged a mortgage that was a close fit with 
my needs,” and 
•  “The lender convinced me to sign a mortgage that I wasn’t 
able to afford.”
Only five respondents considered they had been persuaded 
to sign a mortgage they could not afford; while 21 participants 
thought that the mortgage they signed was a close fit to 
their needs, even though this judgment coincided with their 
admission of having been in mortgage distress (figure 9.1). 
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Figure 9.1 Respondents’ assessment of lenders
III. FACTORS THAT LEAD TO MORTGAGE 
DISTRESS
The interview data show that two or more factors, rather than 
one, combine to make mortgage repayments difficult. The main 
factors leading to mortgage distress appear to fall into three 
categories:
•  changes in the broader economic or financial context (such 
as an economic downturn or rises in interest rates),
•  changes in personal context (such as changes in the 
amount or consistency of income due to changes in 
employment, illness, death or injury of a household member; 
relationship breakdown; or other change in family situation), 
and
•  over-commitment at the time of signing the mortgage 
papers.
Furthermore, the interview data show that once a person or 
household enters mild mortgage distress, the factors leading 
to mortgage distress can snowball, even before the person or 
household can respond in ways that might reverse or relieve 
the situation.
Changes in economic or financial context
Changes in broader economic or financial conditions, external 
to individual or household circumstances, seem to have 
affected most people in our sample in one of two ways:
• by enlarging repayments due to a rise in interest rates, or
•  by reducing disposable income due to changes in 
employment status caused by an economic downturn.
In the majority of our cases, the experience of mortgage 
distress intensified in the three or four years prior to October 
2008, a period when interest rates rose by around 4% in a 
relatively short period of time. 
  “…we originally signed up for we could afford, but we 
didn’t…we put in the variable rates, we didn’t lock…we 
didn’t fix the rates in. So yeah, for the next kind of two 
years we had... you know a number of interest rate rises 
and that… we… you know, that was very challenging.” 
[GABRIELLE]
The interest rate rises in thus period posed a particular 
challenge to those in marginal employment arrangements 
and those with larger mortgages, for whom a small increase 
in interest rates translated into a large increase in monthly 
repayments. Some respondents reported making hasty 
decisions to transfer to fixed interest rate contracts when rates 
were above 7% and they now regret their decisions.
An interesting observation is how unexpected and surprising 
the rise in interest rates was for some of the participants. 
  “And we sort of understood that interest rates move and 
they go up, but you didn’t…nobody expected them to go 
up as much as they did, and how much trouble it would 
cause.” 
[KATE AND JOSH]
The economic downturn left many of the study’s participants 
jobless and others in unsteady work, which in turn affected 
their ability to service their mortgages:
  “…it’s because of the recession; work is a bit slow… 
quiet. So now yeah, it’s a bit…getting a bit hard to pay, 
to make the repayments…because of this recession I 
haven’t got steady work, just on and off casual work.” 
[DANIEL]
The economic downturn also affected some respondents who 
thought they had behaved conservatively and sensibly when 
getting their mortgages. The slowing of the economy introduced 
job instability or insecurity to these households, thereby making 
their mortgages riskier than they had appeared in the past:
  “It was a beautiful house. So when they said you can 
get $525,000, I can have my dream house, and it would 
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have been so easy to go for that. And then was just 
afterwards we thought that’s ridiculous, you know, on 
what we’re earning we can’t …we could have made 
the payments but it wouldn’t…but just something going 
wrong, getting sick or something would have made it 
useless for us. So we thought no, we’ll be sensible and 
we’ll borrow what we can afford to pay off. And as it 
happened it was good because the day after we signed 
on the dotted line and we couldn’t get our deposit back, 
we found I was made redundant.” 
[KATE AND JOSH]
Changes in personal context
Most of the study participants were affected by changes in 
their personal circumstances. These changes, in turn, have 
impacted on the participants’ capacity to make their mortgage 
repayments, usually by affecting their participation in paid 
work. Personal circumstances often manifest as an intricate 
set of problems and challenges that contribute to mortgage 
distress in a snowballing manner. For instance, long term 
sickness brings escalating medical expenses, as well as job 
loss, which in turn leads to a significant loss of income. Or, 
over commitment on a home loan leads to increased credit 
card debt, requiring the working of extra overtime; this leads to 
personal anxiety, relationship stress, and sometimes to mental 
depression.
The reader will notice that the following section presents 
personal circumstances in a largely detached manner. Yet 
as shown in the vignettes in chapter 8, any of the personal 
circumstances listed below can be a trigger for other personal 
problems producing compounding negative effects.
Some of the changing personal circumstances referred to in 
our interviews include:
• illness, injury or disability;
• relationship breakdown;
• career change; and
• change in family situation.
These are now referred to in turn-
•  an illness, injury or disability to one of the household 
members
Such events tend to induce mortgage distress by affecting the 
subject’s ability to work.
  “Turns out I’ve got a problem with my heart, got a few 
blockages in arteries around the body, which is a bit of 
a worry, and lost a bit of time off work because of that, 
and got behind in my payments…Then at the beginning 
of this year I had an accident, fell on the stairs and ended 
up in a wheelchair…And I haven’t worked ever since.” 
[GEORGE]
  “Yeah, I mean, at the time our business was doing 
really well and affording both the repayments weren’t a 
problem for us. And then my…until my husband became 
unwell, then things, the income that we were used to 
bringing in started to go down more and more each 
month, and then we started experiencing problems.” 
[CHARLENE]
But an illness or injury to the borrower or the borrower’s partner 
might also impact on the ability to service the mortgage by 
reducing household income available to service a mortgage, 
even without changed employment circumstances, if a lot of 
money is spent on medicine or other treatment. 
  “My partner is going through cancer…with her 
medication over the last three and a half years, with 




A relationship breakdown has strong financial impact on 
borrowers’ even after the passage of several years. Study 
participants who experienced mortgage distress as a result of 
relationship breakdown were typically female; and we observed 
a number of instances where a relationship breakdown led to 
women becoming sole custodians of their children, and then 
single parent householders with mortgage distress. Parent 
support payments often do not take into account mortgage 
or full rental costs. In a few of our cases, income from support 
payments was considered in the assessment of capacity to 
pay in a home loan application. Yet such income is necessarily 
inconsistent and uncertain into the future. Furthermore, parental 
support typically ceases when a child turns 16 years even 
though many children at that age have not finished school and 
are unable to contribute in any significant sense to household 
income. Two of the single mothers in the interview sample have 
teenage children living in the house without their making any 
financial contribution because they don’t have income from 
which to contribute, or they choose not to do so, or their offers 
are rejected by the mother.
  “…if somebody had said to me probably you know 
when…when my ex-husband first left, obviously it was 
very traumatic because you know it was only a…a six 
month old baby and I was 41 when I had the baby 
so I’m an old mother. I would…I would…if somebody 
had said to me – 10 or it’s 11 years this year – that the 
financial worry of the repercussions of that divorce has 
actually caused more stress than the actual fact of being 
divorced, I would have said that’s not going to happen, 
that would be untrue.” 
[MORNA]
Some interviews demonstrated that mortgage distress can 
also become one of the causes of relationship break up. The 
stress of maintaining mortgage repayments builds pressure 
on relationships; with the presence of mortgage distress seen, 
somewhat ironically, as undermining the opportunity to acquire 
a home as a foundation of a solid and long term relationship. 
   “We’ve split up now and we’re selling the house. So…
and I think yeah a lot of it has got to do with being…yeah 
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stressed and tied…the pressure to pay.” 
[GABRIELLE]
• career change
One participant had taken on a mortgage while studying for the 
purpose of making a career change. Her enrolment prevented 
her from working full time. The respondent faced a major 
dilemma, then, between maintaining her mortgage repayments 
in order to ensure security in dwelling tenure; or maximising her 
educational outcomes to ensure a successful career change. 
  “…I start to study again the different…different 
profession, so yeah, I just do part time work.” 
[HYO SHIN]
• change in family situation
When deciding to take on a mortgage, some interviewees 
trusted that another person would assist them financially. 
But when that help ceased they started to struggle to make 
monthly repayments:
  “Two years after – no, one year after – my daughter got 
married…she stopped helping me with the mortgage…” 
[HUGO]
  “…next year when my son turns 16 and the parenting 
payment cuts out for him…so I’ll have to, you know, 
think about doing something…something because also 
when that cuts out, all the lurks and perks you get with a 
pension payment cut out too, like train fares and reduced 
fares and rego and stuff that you don’t have to pay. That 
will come…that’ll be a big shock having to pay those 
things again…” 
[MARTHA]
The literature identifies the factors identified above as major 
contributors to mortgage distress. An additional factor – the 
birth of a child – is also identified in the literature, although none 
of our respondents reported a child birth event as a factor in 
their experience of mortgage distress. Our suspicion for this 
absence is that people who have recently had a child are less 
likely to have the time or willingness to be part of a research 
project. In fact, three people who filled out the online survey 
listed that one of the reasons for their being in mortgage 
distress was the birth of a child, but none of them provided 
contact details for an interview.
Over-commitment
Over-commitment is a key factor in generating mortgage 
distress. Four of our interviewees believe that if they had 
signed on to a smaller-sized mortgage they would not now 
be struggling. Yet they acknowledged they sought larger 
mortgages in order to buy the house they wanted, even though 
more modest purchases might have been more appropriate in 
retrospect.
Other participants over-committed by refinancing or acquiring 
a second loan because they thought they could increase their 
wealth by renovating or by buying an investment property. They 
were hearing the many stories of people making handsome 
gains from such ventures and thought that it a good idea to 
become involved. 
  “… my husband was afraid, he didn’t want to [take up 
another loan], but I thought that for the future for the girls’ 
future… well, we got into the investment in 2003 which 
was the worst moment because of the skyrocketing 
prices… We were told that we could rent it in a certain 
way…They convinced us to get our daughters as 
signatories into the investment because they were both 
working…”
 [MERDEDES]
A common problem leading to over-commitment is that 
borrowers fail to acknowledge significant household expenses 
when they evaluate their capacity to service a mortgage. The 
following interview extract shows a borrower’s apparent surprise 
at the level and extent of her expenditure commitments which, 
in the case of her household, involved attempting to repay two 
mortgages, one of which was for an investment property:
 
  “We had the house repayments, the car’s fee, the van’s 
fee, the girls’ school fees, they went to private school… 
  “And so we began to have the problem of paying both, 
the investment was already rented but we had to put 
much more money. The repayments were $1900 dollars 
for the house and $1400 or $1500 for the investment. 
From the investment we had, I think we received $900 
rent and the rest, the difference, we had to pay it, plus 
the council, plus the water, plus the basic expenses and 
our expenses. And from then on, as we use to say, “We 
could not keep our heads above water.” 
[MERCEDES]
A decisive observation is that most participants reported 
their belief that at the time the loan was approved they could 
afford the mortgage repayments. They trusted that approval 
was a marker of the financial institution’s professional, expert 
judgement that they would be capable of repaying the loan.
The connection between over-commitment and the perception 
of risk from the borrowers’ perspective is noteworthy. It appears 
that borrowers who over-commit to a mortgage believe that 
the property market will continue to yield capital gains at 
reasonable interest rates settings without questioning the 
strength of these assumptions. Borrowers also seem to enter 
a mortgage contract with a high degree of optimism, believing 
that there will not impediments – unexpected or otherwise – on 
their capacity to repay. They are often motivated to enrol in the 
mortgage search process by the desire to buy the property 
they want; and this desire seems to limit their ability to assess 
the financial risks involved. 
This returns our discussion to the need for quality information 
and its absence in many instances. Many interviewees signed 
up for mortgages that they would subsequently be incapable 
of repaying, often as a result of broader changes in the 
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economy or in financial markets, but also because of changes 
in their personal circumstances. In either case, it is evident 
from many of the stories collected that a significant factor in 
over-commitment was insufficient research and understanding 
on behalf of the potential borrower and, in the absence of 
this research and understanding, an unwarranted trust by the 
potential borrower in the advice and judgement of the broker or 
lending institution. The result of this communication breakdown 
is that a poor financial decision is taken on behalf of the lender, 
with major negative consequences for the affected household. 
To sum up, the reasons behind people falling behind in their 
mortgage repayments are related to interest rises, changes 
in employment status due to a economic downturn or to 
disruptions caused by personal events such as illness, 
disability, injury or a death involving a household member; 
relationship breakdown; or changes within the household such 
as a child getting married or turning sixteen putting an end to 
child-support payments.
We now move to analysing the coping strategies that people 
enact when facing mortgage distress.
IV. COPING STRATEGIES
Overwhelmingly, people in our sample make enormous efforts 
to repay their loans according to prescribed schedules. They 
pay the mortgage repayment first and then juggle their other 
expenses subsequently. 
  “…we have about $1,000 electricity bill we are not able 
to pay, I owe the water more than $1,000 because 
with one…with $900 per fortnight how can you pay the 
mortgage and eat properly and pay the bills and pay the 
electricity?...Yeah that [the mortgage] is my priority.” 
[HUGO]
The coping strategies that were mentioned frequently in our 
research include:
• cutting back on essentials;
• relying on credit cards;
• accessing superannuation or asking for a moratorium;
• looking for additional sources of income; and
• getting independent advice.
• cutting down on luxuries or even basics
  “…he now stopped going to before school care and after 
school care. I can’t afford it…So in the end he was 11 
and he’s in Year 6 and I got him a mobile phone and we 
got a house key cut and he’s been walking to and from 
school. It’s about 3k… almost 3km” 
[MORNA]
  “I’ve been pretty good, I’ve, you know, I don’t go out, 
I have a car that’s from 1994, it’s only a little car …
it doesn’t take much petrol. I don’t have it fully insured 
I only just have the normal insurance that, third party I 
think it’s called you know. I don’t even have insurances 
on my houses; and if anything happens like I…I can’t 
afford to insure them, I haven’t got any excess money to 
insure my houses…
 …I put water on my weet-bix just to get over this.” 
[STELLA]
There were different levels of budgeting among interview 
participants. However, a majority of cases involved thrift and 
abstinence. Some went to extremes of compromising expenditure 
on basics such as food – such that our researchers found it 
difficult to imagine people maintaining such restrictions in the long 
term. The majority of interviewees though were positive that their 
current experience of mortgage distress was a passage they were 
passing through, while others commented they were anxious 
about how much longer they could sustain their limited lifestyles. 
Yet overwhelmingly they saw selling the house and repaying the 
mortgage as an option they were not willing to yield to. 
•  moving spending to credit cards while building larger debts at 
higher interest rates
  “I always pay that [the mortgage] first…So it’s [the credit 
card] got up to $15,000 now that I owe.” 
[MARTHA]
  “I thought one way to do is to have a credit card. So you 
delay your expenses. So I had almost six or seven credit 
cards. ..Then I got very panicked…over $20,000 credit 
card charge.” 
[KAMESH]
Moving expenses to credit cards as a coping strategy is highly 
risky behaviour, leading to higher levels of household debt and 
exacerbated financial stress. Two patterns are observable in 
our interviews. One is that borrowers, pressed with anxiety over 
mortgage distress, opt for credit card spending with the (perhaps 
unrealistic) expectation they might repay the new debt before 
credit card interest and other charges are imposed. Another is that 
lenders create a credit card account as a part of the mortgage 
package; which gives ready access to expensive credit, an 
enticing option for borrowers experiencing mortgage distress. 
• accessing superannuation, or asking for a moratorium
These are options that are only available in special cases. In 
respect of access to superannuation savings, the problem with 
this option is that the borrower and the household are left without 
the financial protection of their superannuation savings.
  “I arranged to draw my money out of my super, so I applied 
to APRA [Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority] to 
get money to pay the arrears and everything. And that 
happened…I was asking for a moratorium on the mortgage.” 
[GEORGE]
• looking for additional sources of income
  “…so what I’ve done is I’ve gotten myself a second job now, 
right, so I work during the day 9:00 to 5:00 Monday to Friday 
at my job and then I go to [RSL CLUB] for three hours.” 
[STELLA]
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Finding other sources of income such as a second job can be a 
positive option in some circumstances; however, job instability 
and long hours of work can see this option have a negative 
effect on other aspects of a household or on the life of the 
worker involved. 
• getting independent financial or legal advice
Only two interviewees mentioned that they had sought 
independent financial or legal advice. However, they did not 
such counselling was able to address the mortgage distress 
problem fully. 
  “I went to legal aid for assistance but the assistance, the 
assistance you can get there, is just counselling, talking. 
But the real assistance is…is to – because I am not in 
arrears – but the real assistance is to help me to pay the 
bills, which is…they…they can’t give you any money, you 
know, all they can give is just talk…talk.” 
[HUGO]
  “I don’t trust financial counsellors. They can’t really help. 
They said just…they just give advice how can I reduce 
the expenses, all that; and I did.” 
[HYO SHIN]
Some interviewees did not know of the existence of free 
legal or financial advice until interviewers mentioned it. One 
respondent said she wanted to seek financial advice but felt 
she couldn’t because of her language limitations:
  “Hundred times [I thought about going to one of these 
organisations which provide financial advice], but I’m 
always blocked because of the language, always blocked 
because of the language.” 
[MERCEDES]
Information gained during our visits to counselling organisations 
suggests that many borrowers see financial advisors when 
most good intervention options have evaporated. Many also 
go with misinformed expectations. Even though research on 
financial counselling is scarce, some literature reports that 
the more hours of financial advice taken the better borrowers 
become at managing mortgages (Collins 2007). Delgadillo 
and Pimentel (2007) assess the effectiveness of counselling 
according to the types and outcomes of loans. They find 
that there are improved chances of beneficial outcomes 
when borrowers consult financial counsellors over a number 
of different periods of the mortgage contract and develop a 
relationship of trust with the counsellor or organisation involved. 
• using multiple strategies to cope
In most cases, several of the coping strategies noted above 
were used simultaneously. 
  “we didn’t go out much…we used a credit a lot…and we 
got extra work…just little bits and pieces…baby sitting or 
work on the [incoherent]…he could fix things…” 
[GABRIELLE]
The desperation of borrowers to meet their mortgage 
obligations using all available options and coping strategies 
relates directly to their unwillingness to sell their houses. 
  “I’d rather just pay off my tax bill and pay off my, my tax 
bill, my accountant and my visa card over the next four 
months or something like that where I…I don’t have 
those and I’m just going to just concentrate on it even if 
I have to go to a soup kitchen and eat for a few weeks, 
you know, just I’m not going to let them have my house.” 
[STELLA]
Even the few with a more matter-of-fact attitude seek to retain 
their houses until they have little chance. 
  “Yeah, that’s our motivation [sending their daughter to 
university]. If there’s a problem I will sell the house. House 
is not important but their education is important.” 
[KAMESH]
  “So worst-case-scenario if it…if it doesn’t go well and 
my…if I don’t get a job and…and anything goes wrong, 
I have to sell the property, that’s a worst thing, but…
yeah…” 
[PETER]
Importantly, the end for many comes by way of formal 
resolution rather than legal dispossession. Two interviewees at 
some point decided that there was no option and they sold the 
house, and one ended up losing her house to the lenders. 
  “…because the investment hadn’t been sold, we put 
my house up for sale. And we sold my house first…the 
house was worth $410,000 and we sold it for $350,000. 
We paid the loan and I think we had $20,000 or $25,000 
left to pay one of the credit cards’ balance.” 
[CHARLENE]
V. THE IMPACTS OF MORTGAGE 
DISTRESS
Despite the differences between members in our sample – in 
terms of age, gender, level of income, reasons for buying a 
house, and so on – there are several things they share in terms 
of their personal experience of mortgage distress. Some of the 
issues that recurred during interviews were:
• shame and feeling of failure;
• loneliness;
• sadness and depression; and
• entrapment by debt.
• shame and feeling of failure
A large majority of interviewees feel ashamed to admit that 
they face mortgage distress. Regardless of the circumstances 
that led them into this situation, they have a sense of failure, of 
having disappointed themselves or others. 
  “…it was just horror and I didn’t want to tell anybody. 
I didn’t want to tell my children because I …I always 
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wanted them to be proud of me and I …I knew they 
couldn’t help me; and I was so depressed sometimes I 
didn’t want to come to work…” 
[LAURA]
Although one of the interviewees commented how the 
economic downturn takes part of the shame away. 
  “Yeah, I think that’s the thing, getting over the 
embarrassment of it. But having said that, I think it’s 
easier for us this time because there’s a recession on, 
so everybody’s sort of…loads of people are on the same 
boat… [And later:] If it wasn’t a recession, I’d probably be 
embarrassed about saying it because I think, ‘Oh people 
think I got sacked cause I was no good,’ you know.” 
[KATE AND JOSH]
• loneliness
Due in part to feeling shame, most people in our sample went 
through the experience of mortgage distress in isolation. They 
have avoided talking about their experience of mortgage distress.
  “There’s not many people I can talk to about it, you know. 
We don’t really have – in the main – really, really close 
friends. We have a lot of friends, like in the Scouts…
But they’re not really so close you can tell them personal 
details.” 
[GEORGE]
In some cases, because those affected see it as a taboo issue, 
people experiencing mortgage distress feel they are the only 
ones going through the experience; which makes them feel 
even more lonely. Being aware of others in a similar situation 
makes them feel “normal”. One interviewee confessed that the 
main reason why she contacted us to become part of the study 
was to hear she was not alone. 
  “You know like I have to talk to the credit card lady, you 
know, just to say that I’m normal. And once you find out 
you are, and that other people are heaps worse, then you 
feel a bit better.” 
[MARTHA]
Those with the opportunity to share their mortgage worries with 
someone else seemed to have found that talking about their 
experience of mortgage distress was therapeutic and helped 
relieve their stress. However, because of the secrecy and 
shame around mortgage distress, the opportunities available 
are often not accepted.
  “I actually went and got counselling, like I went and saw 
a psychologist for, about, I think six visits. And I think 
it was just good to be able to talk to somebody who 
didn’t know, who didn’t know me, I could tell the truth 
about things, too, and how I was feeling, and what was 
happening, and everything like that. So I think for children 
and parents, if they ever find themselves in a situation, it 
needn’t be something, it’s really important they’re able to 
either tell a friend, a good …a safe friend or go and see 
someone that they don’t know and just be able to tell 
somebody.” 
[CHARLENE]
  “…and you have to have that safety net. If the worst 
comes to the worst and we lose the house, we’re still 
going to have family. I know that my parents will come 
down and it’ll be right, okay, spare room’s ready for you, 
just move in that’s it… 
  …we were a very small team within a big company…if I 
went in one day and was really upset over something, oh, 
going to take Kate out for a hot chocolate and I’d cry on 
their shoulder sort of thing…so there was support at work. 
 [KATE AND JOSH]
Even for those who did not disclose the fact that they were in 
mortgage distress, the presence of social ties are an important 
assurance. 
   “One thing we did, I did is talk to my friends, not about 
my…this; other things, you know like music, you know; 
what do you think about that book? What do you…? And 
I read a lot, I read a lot of things. And that gives me…and 
so talking to my friends – not about the mortgage, other 
things – helped me to just not to think about it.” 
[KAMESH]
• sadness and depression
Several participants used the word “depressed” to define how 
they felt. Some talked about having suicidal thoughts.
  “…but you know at some stage I was really, really 
thinking I can’t go any longer. But then again I thought 
about children. No I can’t do that [chuckle].” 
[LAURA]
  “…suicides ideation [sic] was a part of my…I mean I was 
thinking [sighs], ‘I can’t stand it. At least if I kill myself I 
don’t have to worry.’ Then when I was looking at the face 
of my children, I shouldn’t…not planning it, but thinking it.” 
[KAMESH]
In particular, feelings of sadness and depression are common in 
the lives of those who end up selling or losing their houses:
  “And the trauma that you walk through when you actually 
do lose your home to a bank or a lender is terrible. Like 
you wouldn’t wish it on your worst enemy. Like I mean 
you have to keep picking yourself up every morning and 
having a positive outlook to be able to…you have to keep 
going, but the thought of suicide can be very real. And 
I can understand why people just get rid of themselves 
so they don’t have to keep facing like another day of 
what they faced yesterday. Not that I ever felt like that 
but believe me, we’ve had our…we’ve had great night of 
tears all night long…” 
[CHARLENE]
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  “…it’s almost like grieving for a family member, and that’s 
just the possession, and possessions should rule us and 
they’re really not important. But like it almost is a bit like 
that, like cause you’re losing something that you’ve really 
worked hard for, and put the best that you could into.” 
[CHARLENE]
• entrapment by debt
Some interviewees describe the mortgage as something that 
has taken degrees of freedom from their lives. And this loss 
seems to be particularly hard to accept for young borrowers. 
  “But when you realise that’s every fortnight for year and 
years and years you start to go, ‘Oh, yeah.’ You can’t…
you feel like you just can’t get ahead…it felt completely 
tied to the mortgage…trapped, yeah completely 
trapped.” 
[GABRIELLE]
In addition to having a major impact on mental and emotional 
health, mortgage distress can also have a negative effect on 
physical health. Physical effects nominated by participants 
include inability to sleep or eat, poor nutritional intake and 
unhealthy consumption behaviours due to financial restrictions, 
and drinking problems.
  “There was nights when I didn’t sleep all night and I 
would get up and write a letter, another letter, another 
letter. And sometimes I would send, other times not, but 
it helped me to write.” 
[LAURA]
  “What kind of food? It’s just semolina and rice, if there 
is no meat, nothing. But you can just cook the rice. If 
you are hungry you can eat the rice without anything. So 
the kids can eat like that, so it is really poor meal, poor 
dietary. But…but at least we are not outside...” 
[HUGO]
  “I had to find suddenly to get this molar out. Because I 
broke the molar and I couldn’t…they wanted me to have 
root canal therapy and then they want…if you have root 
canal therapy you’ve got to have a crown. And I said, 
‘Well how much is that going to be?’ And they said, ‘Oh 
a couple of thousand.’ And I said, ‘You can forget it. No 
way in the world, take it out.’ ” 
[MORNA]
Mortgage distress can also have a negative impact on an 
individual’s social life. Because of financial restrictions in 
particular, many interviewees claim that they are not able to see 
friends as often as they would like to. Some fear that it will be 
difficult for them to find a partner if their restrictions continue for 
too long:
  “I had a lot of friends still from my theatre days, but 
they’re – a lot of them – are still single. But they live the 
life of the single person and they live in the city, right? 
They’re not going to trip out to where I live, I can tell you. 
They don’t go that far for their holiday you know. So I’d 
have to be tripping into Paddington, and then there’d 
be brunch, and then there’d be lunch, and there’d be a 
film, and there’d be dinner. I couldn’t afford it, I couldn’t 
live their life. So gradually that sort of... you’d be sitting 
at home on those days, and you’d do the house work, 
and you’d go shopping, and you you’d, you know, tidy 
up and do the washing, and then you’d go and get 
a bottle of wine and you’d sit in front and watch the 
midday movie or a DVD, and you’d have a nap, and 
then you’d get up, and then you have another few more 
drinks, and then you nap again. And you’d do this over 
the weekend. And what were you doing, you know, 
you’re putting on weight, you’re putting on more weight, 
then you lose yourself respect, and you don’t achieve 
anything. And suddenly I thought this is crazy.” 
[MORNA]
Finally, mortgage distress can effect decisions about having 
children: deciding not to have children, deferring the decision, 
or settling for having fewer children than desired. As discussed 
above, mortgage distress can lead to a relationship breakdown: 
or it can force a person to stay in relationship just for the sake 
of avoiding the loss of a home. 
  “And also in terms of like having children, we…that was 
always a factor... Like it was like we can’t have kids 
because we can’t afford them. So that, you know, is a 
big thing when considering a mortgage if you know…
we were kind of …didn’t have any children, and got the 
mortgage and then realised that we actually can’t …can’t 
afford to have anyone else… It’s, like, it’s either got to be 
kids or the house.” 
[GABRIELLE]
  “…quite frankly if I knew how difficult it would have…
would be in the last decade and ..and into the future. I 
mean nothing, you know, is going to change, to cope 
and do all this by yourself. Then I probably would have, 
you know, would have maybe not pressed so much for a 
divorce so…so early.” 
[MORNA]
VI. PEOPLE’S EXPECTATIONS FOR  
THE FUTURE
Most people in our sample sounded optimistic about their 
futures when asked to assess the impacts of assistance 
measures like accessing superannuation, refinancing, 
obtaining a moratorium, on repayments; or the impacts of 
potentially damaging events like rising interest rates, job loss, 
or personal injury or illness. Most people do not see complete 
mortgage breakdown as possible even if it has already 
happened once.
  “Like, but we’re both young enough and we both know 
that we’ve got enough working time on our side that we 
will recover pretty quickly…everything that’s happened 
to us, like we won’t let stop us from enjoying our life and 
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moving on. But we have learned a lot and we will be 
using what we’ve learned to help others.” 
[CHARLENE]
   “…but is a good learning lesson. We don’t buy junk 
food. I mean, before we’d buy Coke, MacDonald’s, the 
kids love it. But we don’t now; for the last five, six years, 
we don’t go near to the MacDonald’s…so we learned a 
lesson, but it’s a good, positive thing.” 
[KAMESH]
VII. LOOKING BACK
Do people have regrets? 
Interviewees admitted to a number of regrets about their 
actions and decisions at the time of getting the mortgage 
including: not using a broker, doing more research, requesting 
a smaller loan, saving more for the deposit, and not fixing 
their interest rates. Despite the difficulties, however, people 
expressed determination in keeping their residential property. 
Only one respondent questioned the decision to buy a house 
and the consequences of a long-term mortgage obligation.
What would they do differently? What is their advice for 
others thinking about getting a mortgage? Many actions 
and strategies were raised repeatedly when interviewees 
responded to these questions. Many warned of over-
committing. Most commonly, though, interviewees stressed 
the need for more information before committing to a 
mortgage; and of not relying so much on the advice given by 
the broker or lender. 
  “I think probably get more advice about the options 
available and a bit more about what happens if things go 
wrong. I just don’t think when you take a mortgage out 
you think you’re going, things will go wrong... but you’ve 
got to be prepared for it… 
  …I wouldn’t have put so much emphasis on home 
ownership…it doesn’t really matter whether or not you 
own your home. I mean it’s a good investment in lots of 
ways, but it…it actually ties you…ties you down, and it 
dictates the way you live your life…I realise that home-
ownership isn’t necessarily a given…that there are other 
ways to live.” 
[GABRIELLE]
  “I think if I did it a third time, I would try to do it myself 
rather than work through a broker…go and talk with 
somebody direct myself. Because I don’t think they’ve 
always got the best interest of the customer in there…
they think…you know they’re always looking after 
themselves as well.” 
[MICHAEL]
  “Don’t buy with huge mortgage, just whatever you can 
pay…I suggest they buy really careful with a budget, 
within a budget…Is this the best house? Because even 
though they buy a good house, with…with stressful life 
they can’t be happy” 
[HYO SHIN]
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Our findings stand in stark contrast to the analysis of 
mortgage performance by ratings agencies and financial 
institutions where mortgage stress and distress are judged 
not be of concern in relation to the stability of the Australian 
finance industry or the national economy. Yet, as we have 
shown, where stress and distress occur they invariably 
involve great personal hardship. While in the recent past the 
incidence of mortgage distress has been substantially lower 
in Australia than in the US or Europe, this is little comfort for 
those involved.
Yet mortgage distress has been rising in Australia. How 
does Australian society in popular discourse and through 
its financial regulators perceive growing levels of mortgage 
distress, and financial stress in general?
There is a view that people in mortgage distress have over-
reached their financial capacity. There is view, too, that some 
are in mortgage distress as a result of having speculated in 
the property market and lost. But there is also the contrary 
popular view: that otherwise cautious people in ways they 
cannot fully understand have found themselves agreeing to 
sign up for loans that left them insufficiently protected against 
even small changes in circumstances. 
Our case studies show elements of each of these, and of 
combinations of them. This is not surprising. There is always 
a propensity for financial institutions, driven by a search 
for yield, to pursue lending to the limits of what is deemed 
feasible. And there is a propensity for borrowers to borrow to 
their limits.
In the real world, though, feasibility and limits are context 
specific. What is reasonable in one situation may not be 
reasonable in another. Every economic boom and downturn 
reminds us that contexts change rapidly and in uncertain 
ways. The question is how we allow for an uncertain future.
Following calamitous circumstances in Australia in the mid 
and late 1980s, risk management practices in Australia 
among both financial institutions and regulators seem to 
have performed well in a range of economic and financial 
circumstances. Notably, Australia’s experience of the global 
financial crisis remained within manageable limits, albeit 
with the assistance of federal government guarantees and a 
substantial fiscal stimulus. A result is that the nation’s financial 
institutions remain robust.
But households rarely devise and enact risk management 
strategies. Nor are they provided with state underwriting when 
they are financially fragile. 
In a sense the comparison between financial institutions 
and households is false – for a crisis of financial institutions 
can be systemic, while crises within households are 
individually experienced and contained, usually with no wider 
ramifications. Accordingly, mortgage distress is generally seen 
as a private or personal problem, becoming a state issue only 
insofar as it may be associated with poverty, thereby triggering 
more general welfare concerns and societal obligations.
However, this report suggests otherwise. While mortgage 
stress and distress are private and personal, there are 
systemic explanations for their occurrence just as we can 
observe general patterns in their incidence. This report has 
shown that:
1. mortgage distress is geographically concentrated
2.  it is likely to arise when income is disrupted especially 
by poor labour market conditions, illness, relationship 
breakdown and by child birth
3. its impacts are severe and ongoing.
While our survey of the experience of mortgage distress is not 
comprehensive, our recruitment difficulties reveal the intensity 
of personal shame felt by those experiencing mortgage 
distress. Most people are very reluctant to talk of their 
experience of mortgage distress. We had to adjust our survey 
expectations to deal with this problem, and a consequence is 
that our results should be seen as providing evidence – albeit 
strong evidence – for our claims rather than statistical proof. 
That we have exposed a profound problem indicates the need 
for more comprehensive research into the issue.
Moreover, insofar as this report brings forward evidence 
of patterns of events and likely causes that lie beyond the 
domains of private judgments, the reports reveals our need to 
re-think mortgage distress as a problem that travels beyond 
a person or household, to wider social processes and the 
stresses – risks, even – they generate. 
Certainly there is a need for better financial literacy among 
borrowers as a complement to more vigilant prudential 
supervision of mortgage products, as an improved consumer 
protection package. Indeed our respondents argued strongly 
for such improvements.
Beyond the need for more informed mortgage acquisition 
processes to improve both individual and institutional 
decision making, our report provides strong evidence that 
households’ experiences of mortgage distress – including 
the enormous efforts and sacrifices householders make to 
meet their mortgage contract obligations -- need to become a 
central issue in the way we conceive of financial stability. The 
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concept of financial stability must apply not only to financial 
institutions but to elements of society, including households 
that lie outside the formal financial sector. Such a re-
conceptualisation requires that financial regulation serve wider 
social needs than it does currently.
It is an issue that warrants further consideration and wider 
debate.
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11 POLICY   IMPLICATIONS
Arising from its discussions in the chapters above, this report 
recommends the following:
1.  There be more extensive research on household 
experiences of financial stress and mortgage distress, to 
discern further their patterns and causes. Currently, this 
research is being conducted on the one hand by housing 
researchers with no direct links to issues of financial 
regulation, and on the other hand by ratings agencies and 
financial institutions whose focus is on risk management, 
but without an understanding or agenda for addressing the 
social problems of financial stress and mortgage distress. 
The social problems of household financial stress and 
mortgage distress need to be seen as integral to financial 
regulation.
2.  Monitoring of the causes, evidence and consequences of 
mortgage distress (and financial stress in general) need to 
be distinctive and discrete tasks within financial regulation. 
These are not matters that can be covered adequately 
within the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority’s 
(APRA) responsibilities for the prudential supervision of 
financial institutions, or through the Australian Security and 
Investment Commission’s (ASIC) programs for advancing 
financial literacy.
3.  The community services, government and non-government 
organisations which deal with people in financial stress 
and mortgage distress possess enormous knowledge of 
householder experiences of mortgage distress and under-
recognised source of generous and capable assistance. 
Together these assistance organisations should be 
regarded as more than the providers of assistance to those 
who have failed to leap the home ownership hurdle. These 
organisations are an important resource which needs to 
be brought inside mainstream management of financial 
stability.
4.  The regulation of mortgage products needs to acknowledge 
the vulnerability of many borrowers:
   a. More and better information resources need to be 
created in order to help people make better decisions 
about their mortgages. The value of this information is 
diminished, however, if exaggerated and uncontested 
claims about mortgage products are disseminated via 
the advertising campaigns of mortgage finance suppliers 
and agents.
   b. Regulatory authorities should establish procedures for 
vetting mortgage product advertising, with the capacity 
to force advertising to be reviewed or withdrawn, before 
transmission, to ensure a quality information environment 
for decision making about mortgage products.
   c. Mortgage finance contracts should be independently 
inspected and commented on by accredited financial 
advisers prior to conclusion.
   d. A typical intervention would involve a one-hour 
documentary inspection and preparation of commentary 
and a one-hour client briefing if considered necessary. 
Accredited financial advisers should be drawn from 
suitably qualified persons with a variety of social and 
cultural backgrounds, including from the pool of financial 
counsellors employed by charity organisations and other 
NGOs.
   e. A suitably resourced public agency should team 
with accredited financial advisers to coordinate and fill 
gaps in the supply of educational and other information 
resources to assist potential borrowers make informed 
decisions concerning mortgage products. Materials 
should be available face-to-face and on-line and be 
targeted at potentially vulnerable and information poor 
groups. 
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PART 1: THE MORTGAGE
PART 2: THE SIGNATORIES
PART 3: THE TRANSACTION
PART 4: MORTGAGE 
DISTRESS
Explain that the project focuses on residential properties
Have you had a mortgage on a residential property in the last 4 years? Why did 
you decide to buy a house? Can you describe how you made the decision that you 
wanted and could take up a mortgage? Tell us about that property: is it a house/flat? 
Where is it located? Do you still have the mortgage? 
What institution did you get that mortgage with? 
Were you a signatory? Who were the other signatories? 
How did you choose a lender? 
How did you choose a particular mortgage option? 
Describe to us the meetings with the lender? Who attended those meetings? What 
type of relationship did you have with the lender?
Tell us about the information that the lender gave you. 
Tell us about the information that the lender asked you to provide.
What was your perception at the time about the mortgage you were getting? 
How confident were you at the time of your ability to repay it? 
Did you talk to the lender about what would happen if you would start finding it 
difficult to make your monthly payments? Can you describe this conversation to us?
How easy/difficult was it for you and the other signatories to deal with the lender?
When did you first start having difficulties paying the mortgage?
What changed in your situation that made it difficult for you to make your monthly 
payments? 
When did you talk to the lender about it? 
Describe your conversations with him. 
What did you do when you realised you were having problems making your 
repayments? 
How has being in mortgage distress affected your life? 
What is your perception today of the mortgage you got?
If you could go back in time, what (if anything) would you do differently? 
What would your advice be for someone who is thinking about getting a mortgage?
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2. INFORMATION SHEET 
Project title: The experience of mortgage distress in Sydney’s geographical hot spots
This is an invitation to participate in a study about the mortgage experience from the perspective of the borrower, in identified 
Sydney’s suburbs where the occurrence of mortgage distress is high.
What is the study about?
The aim of the study is to explore the process that leads to mortgage distress from the perspective of the borrower in identified 
areas of Sydney considered geographical hot spots for the occurrence of mortgage distress. The results will contribute to develop a 
better understanding of the issues that cause mortgage distress and be able to identify early signs of poor mortgage practices.
Who is carrying out the study?
The study is being carried out by Professor Phillip O’Neill Director, Professor Peter Phibbs Academic Program Coordinator; Dr Olga 
Camacho, Research Project Officer and Dr. Jessica Casiro Research Officer, from the Urban Research Centre at the University of 
Western Sydney.
What does the study involve?
The in-depth interviews are the second part of this study. The first part is a self administered survey that you may have answered 
already. This in-depth interview involves you talking about your mortgage experience; the themes are similar to the survey questions 
but adding more detail and depth to the answers. The interview will approximately run for 45 minutes, and will take place at the 
Urban Research Centre offices in Parramatta CBD or a site that is convenient to you.
Is there any possibility of me experiencing risks, inconveniences or discomforts during my participation in the study?
There may be a slight possibility that by answering some questions you may feel some discomfort from answering questions that 
you may consider personal and private regarding your mortgage experience. However, you are free to choose when not to answer a 
specific question and the interview can take a different course whenever you consider it appropriate.
Can I withdraw from this study?
Being in this study is completely voluntary; you are not under any obligation to consent. If you agree to participate in the interview, 
you can refuse to answer some questions, postpone or stop the interview at any time without giving any explanations. 
Will anyone else know the results of my surveys? 
The results of the interviews will be added together, your name or identity will not be used in any case. We will be able to inform you 
about the results of the research if you wish.
Will the study benefit me?
The study will not benefit you directly or immediately. It will benefit the community at large because this study will provide a better 
understanding of the issues influencing mortgage distress. You will receive a $50 grocery voucher to compensate you for your 
efforts to participate in the interview. 
If there is any problem or further question you are invited to contact Dr. Olga Camacho Duarte on 02 8833 5901 or  
ol.camacho@uws.edu.au 
Note: This study has been approved by the University of Western Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee. The Approval Number is H6794 If you have any 
complaints or reservations about the ethical conduct of this research you may contact the Ethics Committee through the Research Ethics Officers (tel: 02 4736 
0883). Any Issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated fully, and you will be informed of the outcome.
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3. CONSENT FORM 
Project title: The experience of mortgage distress in Sydney’s geographical hot spots
Participant’s Name
Interviewer’s Name
In giving my consent I acknowledge that:
1.  I have read the information sheet; I understand what the study is about, my involvement in the study and I am willing to 
participate.
2.  I know that the interview will take about 45 minutes and that at any given time I can refuse answering a question, postpone or 
stop the interview without having to provide any explanation.
3. The risks, inconveniences and discomforts in this study have been explained to me. 
4.  I understand that my ideas will be used in combination with other participants’ ideas and that my identity will never be revealed 
in any document resulting from this interview.
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4. COMMUNITY ORGANISATIONS CONSULTED DURING THIS STUDY
Community Resource Network
Community First Step
Creating Links Co op
Credit Line Wesley Mission
Granville Multicultural Community Centre
Hawkesbury Legal centre
Lifeline Western Sydney Parramatta Mission
Lower Mountains Neighbourhood Centre 
Macquarie Legal Centre
Men’s Health Australia 
Mid Mountains Neighbourhood Centre
Mountains Community Resource Network
Money Care Parramatta (Salvation Army)
Parks Community Centre
Rouse Hill Families Connect
South Penrith Youth & Neighbourhood Services Inc.
The Hills Community Aid & Info Service Inc
Woodville Community Services


